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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the effect of European Central Bank asset purchase 
programs to corporate bond issuance in European countries. Thesis distinguishes between 
two main transmission channels of quantitative easing to corporate bond issuance by 
examining both the debt holdings and purchases effect during the ECB quantitative easing. 
 
Thesis employs a panel dataset of 15 499 bond issues from 19 European countries between 
years 2000 and 2015 with a series of explanatory variables controlling for changes in the 
macroeconomic environment and lending behavior. Countries are grouped to developed 
and frontier markets of the European Union to control for different characteristics in the 
level of integration to the European financial markets. Additional tests include various 
econometric techniques and tests for changes in the qualitative factors over the time period. 
 
Results suggest a significant positive relationship between the ECB debt holdings and the 
corporate bond issuance, i.e. stock effect, which is particularly strong in the developed 
economies of Europe. This provides further evidence on the existence of portfolio 
rebalancing where the investors are crowded out from assets that are targeted by the QE. 
Flow effects of the ECB purchases do not appear to have a significant impact on bond 
issuance in the European markets. Robustness tests indicate a strong influence from the 
foreign central banks and that the decrease in credit supply has increased corporate bond 
issuance after the financial crisis. Additionally, during the QE programs, the average credit 
rating has decreased indicating that companies with lower credit quality issue more debt 
during times of excess liquidity. These results provide information to the policy makers on 
the early impact of the ECB quantitative easing and a basis for analysis on the corporate 
lending behavior during unconventional monetary policies. 
 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: Corporate bonds, Monetary policy, Quantitative easing, ECB 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the post–crisis global economy the central banks have assumed a key role in guiding the 
stability of the financial markets. After the key interest rates, that during “normal” market 
conditions are the main tools for monetary policy, were dropped to zero the central banks of 
different economic regions have relied on unconventional monetary policies to retain 
financial stability and stimulate economic activity. The central bank of the United States, 
namely Federal Reserve System or Fed, began its purchases of Treasury bonds and 
mortgage backed securities (MBS) in late 2009, a program often referred as quantitative 
easing or QE. 
The European Central Bank (ECB) has also engaged in asset purchase programs in the 
Eurozone in order to return the European Union back to the path of financial stability. 
Previous programs, namely the Covered Bond Purchase Program (CBPP) and Security 
Markets Program (SMP) in 2009 and 2010 respectively, were successful in reducing the 
volatility of the financial markets and lowered the government bond yields but perhaps 
different in nature when comparing to the actions taken by Fed. Eventually these programs 
were terminated and followed by a larger quantitative easing program in 2015. By 
launching the latest asset purchase program (APP) in March 2015, the ECB committed 
EUR 60 billion á month to revitalize the Eurozone economy and counter deflation for an 
extended period of time. 
The impact of these quantitative easing programs to the global economy is a matter of great 
interest to the academic community. Effects of QE to assets such as the government issued 
debt are somewhat straightforward as they are more or less derived from equilibrium 
studies of traditional economics by examining yield/price relationship. But since the 
additional liquidity in the possession of institutional investors has ripple effects to other 
assets as well, a multiple of interesting and novel research areas emerge. Gilchrist et al. 
(2015) show that the global corporate bond issuance has increased significantly after the 
financial crisis and the credit spread between corporate and government debt has shrank 
significantly. Our interest is to study whether the QE programs, especially in the case of 
ECB asset purchase programs, have led to this increased eagerness to issue debt to the 
capital markets.  
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There are several explanations why QE and corporate bond issuance might be linked 
together: Firstly, as Fratzscher et al. (2013) show, the purchases of government debt lowers 
the yields of government bonds which in turn may incentivize investors to search for higher 
yielding assets. Secondly, the QE contributes positively to general investor confidence by 
increasing the supply of money which stimulates economic activity. For example, several 
financial surveys indicated increased investor confidence after the ECB APP was launched 
and ongoing (Bloomberg, 2015). And thirdly, the purchases of government debt tend to 
crowd out investors from the markets where the central bank operates. On the investor side 
this triggers the so–called “portfolio rebalancing” where investors replace government debt 
securities with assets that hold the similar kind of return and risk (Mishkin, 1996). These 
three elements and transmission channels will be discussed throughout this thesis. It is also 
important to address the fact that if traditional hypotheses regarding the efficiency of the 
financial markets would hold true, the financing decisions should only be driven by the 
need of funds for investing purposes, not the current price of the debt. These questions are 
also addressed in the section discussing the corporate capital structure and market timing 
theories.  
Large amount of previous research exist on the possible transmission channels of monetary 
policy and recent studies such as Duca et al. (2016), Gilchrist et al. (2015) and McCauley et 
al. (2015) study the effect of Fed quantitative easing to both global and U.S. corporate bond 
issuance and yields. This thesis contributes to the existing literature by examining purely 
European sample and including the most recent purchase program to examine the effect of 
QE to bond issuance. At the time of writing this thesis there are no previous empirical 
researches studying the effect of the latest APP in Europe. This thesis is thus among the 
first to assess the early success of the ECB APP in its efforts to revitalize the European 
economy.  
1.1 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how ECB’s asset purchase programs affect 
corporate bond issuance. More precisely, this thesis investigates whether the purchases of 
European government debt securities have an impact on the behavior of the key market 
participants this is (i.e.) the bond investors and the corporate bond issuers. This includes the 
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analysis of possible transmission channels of the unconventional monetary policy to 
corporate bond issuance. 
The study analyzes two possible transmission channels of the monetary policy to corporate 
bond issuance consistent with the previous research by D’Amico and King (2013). The first 
is the effect of debt holdings in the central bank’s balance sheet. This can affect the 
issuance as the ECB holds an increasing share of the government securities, the lack of 
availability forces investors to seek for other assets to invest. This channel is hereinafter 
referred as the “stock effect”. The second transmission channel is the effect of purchases or 
more specifically, the increase in the size of the ECB’s debt holdings between time periods. 
This channel is later referred as the “flow effect”. This way it is possible to investigate 
which is more effective in the European context, the asset holdings or the purchases of the 
government bonds. The stock and flow effects are examined in the context of 19 European 
countries which are divided in groups on the basis of the respective countries characteristics 
and market activity. Two groups of countries are named as “developed” countries 
comprising of core EU countries and “frontier” markets comprising of countries with less 
integrated capital markets. The two main explanatory variables are regressed with a set of 
controlling variables aiming to capture the effects of the surrounding economic 
environment. 
The contribution of this thesis is to provide evidence of the monetary policies effect on 
corporate bond issuance along with McCauley et al. (2015) and Duca et al. (2016). A large 
share of the existing studies focus on the quantitative easing effect on bond yields 
examining especially the impact of U.S. monetary policy. This thesis contributes to the 
existing literature by focusing on the European environment and thus provides information 
on the success of quantitative easing in a bank–oriented debt capital market. At the time of 
writing this thesis, there is no existing empirical research on the latest ECB asset purchase 
program which commenced in March 2015. Thesis provides information on the effect of 
decreasing credit supply from the banks to the corporations during financial crisis and 
finally, how companies with different credit quality react to unconventional monetary 
policies.  
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1.2 Research hypotheses 
The hypotheses of this study revolve around the issue of whether the monetary policies 
affect the corporate financing decisions. According to traditional finance theory and 
efficient capital markets, the timing of the issuance should not play a decisive role in the 
decision making process but the issuance should be driven purely by investment needs of 
the company. The first hypothesis is drawn from the connection of the asset purchase 
programs and corporate debt issuance: 
H0: ECB APP’s do not affect the corporate bond issuance in Europe. 
H1: ECB APP’s have an effect on corporate bond issuance in Europe. 
If it is the case that the null hypothesis is rejected, we can draw two additional hypotheses 
relating to the stock and flow effects of the asset purchase programs. According to the 
previous research conducted by D’Amico & King (2013) and Duca et al. (2016) the effect 
of asset purchase programs can be divided in to these two categories. Second hypothesis is 
relating to the stock effect: 
H2: The amount of debt securities held by the ECB affects corporate bond issuance. 
And the third hypothesis relating to flow effect is: 
H3: The amount of debt securities purchased by the ECB during a specific time period 
affects the corporate bond issuance. 
In the additional tests we also examine whether the asset purchase programs have 
encouraged companies with lower credit ratings to issue more debt because of excess 
market liquidity and increased demand of debt securities. The fourth hypothesis is: 
H4: Corporate bond issues with higher/lower credit ratings increased due to the added 
demand caused by the QE  
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Because the hypotheses 2 and 3 can only hold true in case the first null hypothesis is 
rejected the analysis of the results is somewhat straightforward. In case there is a 
statistically significant difference in the issuance amounts before and after of the QE started 
in Europe, we can assume that either one or both of the hypotheses 2 and 3 holds true. The 
fourth hypothesis is tested on separate regression because the qualitative data on the credit 
ratings is not included in the benchmark model. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis proceeds as follows: The second chapter focuses on the theoretical literature 
discussing bond pricing and risk fundamentals and presents the key theories of corporate 
financing and capital structure. The third chapter reviews previous literature focusing on 
empirical research on asset purchase effects on debt capital markets. Fourth chapter 
presents the data and methodology used in this thesis and discusses the European corporate 
bond market characteristics before and after the financial crisis. Fifth chapter presents the 
results of the regression analysis and discusses the results in the context of the hypotheses. 
Sixth chapter summarizes the main results and provides conclusions and suggestions for 
future research.  
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2. THEORY AND CORPORATE BOND FUNDAMENTALS 
Although this thesis focuses on the corporate bond issuance and the main hypothesis are 
not focused on the risk or return characteristics per se, it is beneficial to understand the 
fundamentals of bonds in general and specifically corporate bonds. After shortly describing 
the pricing and risk characteristics of corporate bonds, this chapter introduces the issuance 
process of corporate bonds and the main theories relevant for this thesis. 
2.1 Corporate bond pricing and risks 
2.1.1 Relationship between yield and price 
The cash flows of a bond are its annual coupon payments plus the final principal. 
Therefore, price (P0) of a bond is determined by future cash flows: coupon payments (C) 
and par value (PV) discounted by selected discount rate (r): 
(1)                    𝑃0 =
𝐶
1 + 𝑟
+
𝐶
(1 + 𝑟)2
+ ⋯ +
𝐶
(1 + 𝑟)𝑛
+
𝑃𝑉
(1 + 𝑟)𝑛
 
Another important concept of bond investing is yield, indicating the return that investor 
receives from a bond. Unlike the interest rate used for discounting the yield is not fixed. 
The current yield is calculated using the following formula: 
(2)                    𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 =  
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
 
When an investor buys a bond at its face value (par), yield is equal to the interest rate. But 
often the price does not remain the same for long periods of time and as the price and yield 
of a bond have a negative correlation, an increase in price decreases the current yield. 
Common measure to compare bonds with different characteristics is yield to maturity 
(YTM) which indicates the realized return that investor will receive, should he hold the 
bond to maturity. This combines all the above factors (current market price, par value, 
coupon payments and time to maturity) into one and therefore it makes it easier to compare 
bonds with different maturities and coupons. YTM also assumes that the interest payments 
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received during the lifespan of the bond are invested at the same rate as the bond’s current 
yield. (Fabozzi 2012: 48–50.)  
(3)              𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑇𝑜 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝐶 +
𝑃𝑉 − 𝑃0
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑃𝑉 + 𝑃0
2
 
2.1.2 Yield curve 
The visualization of term structure of interest rates is known as the yield curve, which 
shows the yield on bonds with different maturities as is illustrated in Figure 1. The term 
structure of interest rate measures the difference in yields of U.S. Treasuries or other non-
default securities that differ only in terms of maturity. Yield curve tends to be upward 
sloping, called the positive yield curve but both inverted and flat yield curves exist when 
investors expect the future interest rates to decline or the near future of the market is 
uncertain (Fabozzi 2012: 109). The yield curve reflects investor’s expectations about future 
changes in interest rates, business conditions and monetary policy. Investors usually 
demand higher yield from long-term bonds than from short-term ones. This is due to the 
fact that as maturity extends to a longer time period it becomes increasingly difficult to 
forecast the future changes and bond prices become more volatile. Quantitative easing can 
be conducted by altering the yield curve to a different shape (see e.g. Operation twist) or if 
shorter term lending is incentivized, QE pursues to steepen the yield curve by purchasing 
short term bonds. (Brealey et al. 2011: 84.)  
Figure 1. Three different kind of yield curves (Fabozzi 2012: 110) 
14 
2.1.3 Corporate bond risks 
Understanding how the yield on bonds is defined and calculated is necessary to discuss the 
fundamental difference between government issued and corporate issued debt. Investors 
often require a higher coupon or yield from corporations because governments are more 
reliable in paying back their debt as they can raise taxes from their citizens. This difference 
in required yield between corporate and government bonds is often regarded as the yield 
spread. In order to understand the corporate bonds from the investor’s perspective, a brief 
overlook of the corporate bond risks and the factors contributing to the yield spread is 
provided below. 
Default risk 
The magnitude of default risk is determined by two components: (1) the expected default 
loss rate – which is the risk that in the event of default, investors will not receive the full 
amount of the promised cash flows; (2) credit risk premium, which compensates for bearing 
the default risk on bonds. The expected default loss rate is then directly related to the 
default probability of the firm and the recovery-rate in the event of default (Fabozzi 2012: 
178.):  
(4)            𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 ×  (100% –  𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) 
Default rate for a company can be evaluated from historical data: Table 1 shows the 
historical default probability through time of companies with certain credit rating. For 
example, since 1990 BB- rated issuer has had 1.05% average historical probability of 
defaulting within one year and 2.80% probability of doing so within two years.  
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Table 1. Average cumulative default rates (%). Table shows an average default rate in different rating classes 
and maturities between 1990 and 2014 (Fitchratings 2015) 
% One-year Two-year Three-year Four Year Five-Year 10-year 
AAA 0,11 0,22 0,34 0,47 0,59 0,97 
AA - - 0,11 0,27 0,44 0,49 
A 0,05 0,24 0,42 0,65 0,88 2,04 
BBB 0,09 0,47 0,94 1,50 2,03 4,07 
BB 0,66 2,25 3,95 5,59 6,94 12,26 
B 2,15 4,90 7,50 10,66 13,61 14,81 
CCC to C 23,52 30,36 34,73 36,64 38,97 39,88 
 
The second component of default loss rate is the recovery-rate which is the percentage of 
face value that the holders of defaulted bonds recover. Table 2 shows historical recovery 
rates in different kind of debt types: 
Table 2. Discounted ultimate recovery rates by debt type and seniority (Fabozzi 2012: 175) 
Type of Debt/ Seniority Average Recovery rate (%) 
Bank Loan 82 
Senior Secured Debt 65 
Senior Unsecured Debt 38 
Senior Subordinated Debt 29 
Subordinated Bond 27 
Junior Subordinated Bond 15 
All Bonds 37 
 
The second part of default risk, the credit risk premium emerges from the systematic risks 
included in corporate bonds. Systematic risks are related to the fact that capital markets 
move together and in case of global recession the defaults tend to cluster which results that 
the compensation for expected default becomes insufficient as the probability of default 
increases (Elton et al. 2001.). The systematic risk is also described as the same systematic 
risk that affects the stock market such as changes in the interest rate or volatility. 
The rise of different derivatives enable market participants to control their credit risk: The 
most common type of derivative being credit default swap (CDS) where the buyer makes 
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periodic payments to seller until the maturity or until default event occurs. If default occurs, 
the seller of CDS buys the bond from the insured at par value. Credit default swap data 
offers more accurate information about credit risk than bond yield data as it can be seen as 
a transfer of pure credit risk form one market participant to another while bond price data is 
subject to several other factors. (Hull et al. 2004.)  
Liquidity risk 
The liquidity’s effect on the price of a bond is quite straightforward: the more liquid the 
issue – the lower is the liquidity premium. U.S. Treasuries and German 10y Bunds in 
Europe are one of the most liquid securities in the world, hence for small corporations and 
small issues, the liquidity effect on yield spread is expected to be greater (Jong & Driessen 
2006.). Important determinant of liquidity’s effect on the yield spread is whether the issue 
is “on-the-run”, meaning a recently issued and in result more liquid or “off-the-run” which 
means that the issue is older and traded less (Fabozzi 2012: 108). Liquidity can be 
measured with the difference between the ask price and the bid price (bid–ask spread) 
quoted in the market. In Figure 2 is presented the average bid-ask spreads on U.S 
investment grade corporate bonds compared to European investment grade corporate 
bonds. After Fed started the QE program in 2008, we can see that the liquidity has 
significantly improved in the market and the figure clearly shows how the bid–ask spread 
increases in financial turmoil. Additional observation is that the overall liquidity risk is 
significantly higher in Europe. The liquidity premium could be a result of lower volumes of 
trading in Europe and indicates that the debt capital market in Europe is not as active as its 
counterpart in the U.S.   
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Other risks relating to bond investments 
Following list of risks is meant to be complementary and provide an overview of risks that 
are often mentioned when discussing the risks of corporate bonds (Fabozzi 2012). 
 Call risk if the bond is callable, in case of a significant decline in interest rates the 
company is likely to refinance (call) the bond in order to make a new issue of bonds 
at a lower interest rates. Call option of a bond is generally regarded as a risk to the 
investor, since the investor has to reinvest the money consequently at lower interest 
rate. 
Market risk emerges from the general shifts in the market conditions. This includes 
factors such as inflation, interest rates and different policy actions. Because 
corporate debt instruments offer relatively stable cash flows, the value of these 
instruments are not as volatile as equities and can be considered as safe-havens 
when the equities market faces a downturn, at least in the case of U.S Treasuries. 
Duration is the measure for bond prices sensitivity to interest rate risks and longer 
maturity bonds have higher duration than short term bonds. 
Downgrade risk is related to the assigned credit rating that bond receives from the 
ratings agency. Because majority of investors assess the overall riskiness of the 
Figure 2. Bid-ask spread index (BASI) differential between buy and sell trades of the US investment grade 
corporate debt and European investment grade corporate debt (MarketAxess 2016) 
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company based on the given credit ratings, the deterioration of credit rating will 
have an impact on the price and yield of the bond. The credit rating system is further 
explained in the following chapter. 
 
2.1.4 Credit ratings 
For an individual investor, it would be difficult to assess all the above mentioned risk 
factors. For these purposes the "big three" credit rating agencies (CRAs) – U.S.-based 
Standard and Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch – characterize their assessment of the firm’s 
riskiness with a letter system, the safest being AAA, with lower grades moving to double 
and single letters. Table 3 is provides the equivalent credit ratings across different rating 
agencies. 
Table 3. Corporate bond ratings systems and symbols (SIFMA 2016) 
 
Rating agencies evaluate risk factors from current market conditions like the economic 
situation in global market, to firm-specific variables such as the financial position of the 
company in order to determine the probability of company paying back its debts as 
promised. This is extended with an analysis of the percentage of the funds likely to be 
returned to the investor in case of a default, the recovery rate. This rating has significant 
impact on the pricing of corporate’s debt as investors require higher return from companies 
that are more likely to have problems with its payments (SIFMA 2016.). 
Financial crisis in 2008 revealed problems in the way the CRAs generate revenues. White 
(2010) argues that the shift from business model where “investors pay” the agency for the 
 Standard & Poor's Fitch Moody's 
Investment  
grade 
AAA AAA Aaa 
AA AA Aa 
A A A 
BBB BBB Baa 
 
Speculative 
Grade 
(High yield) 
BB BB Ba 
B B B 
CCC,CC,C CCC,CC,C Caa,Ca 
D D C 
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ratings to a practice where “issuer pays” for the ratings contributed to the subprime 
mortgage crisis. The problem was that the CRAs were overly optimistic in their 
assessments of the credit risk of the MBS products which led the investors to believe that 
the riskiness of these products was lower than it actually was. White (2010) showcases that 
90% of the collateralized debt obligation (CDOs) issued between 2005 and 2007 which 
were originally rated as AAA by the S&P were downgraded as of June 30, 2009 with 80% 
of these CDOs then rated below investment grade. This provides an example of how the 
CRAs were pressured to give good ratings to the products because the issuer could always 
pick another CRA to assess the rating which would mean lower revenues for the rating 
agency in question. 
2.2 Corporate bond issuance 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the corporate finance decision making process 
that directs the corporations to issue debt in the capital markets. Because this thesis focuses 
on the European corporate bond market, it is purposeful to also focus on the characteristics 
of the European debt capital market which differs from the more mature and liquid U.S. 
market. Traditionally, the European corporations have been financed mainly by loans from 
the financial institutions while the U.S counterparts have actively sought financing from the 
investors in the market. Schinasi & Smith (1998) study the success of the U.S. debt market 
and identify that among other factors the market power of financial institutions, regulatory 
policies, taxation and investor base have all contributed to the success of the U.S. debt 
market and in the same time, the lack of these factors has constrained the development of 
the debt market in Europe.  
The length of the process of bond issuance is dependent on the complexity and the size of 
the issue. Since the company rarely has the staff or know-how to execute this sort of bond 
issuance, they hire the help of an investment advisor which handles the process for its 
clients. The advisor also often underwrites debt and then forms a syndicate with other 
banks that are willing to purchase a part of the debt. After forming the syndicate, lead 
advisor will structure the debt by offering it to the institutional investors to determine the 
right pricing and maturity according to the investor appetite on the market. And once the 
regulatory paperwork has been complied with, the bond is ready to be released to the 
market (LSE, 2016.). This whole process can take up to 12 months depending on the 
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investors appetite which is also why there is a certain risk that the advisor underwrites a 
debt that, due to the changing market conditions, is not as attractive at time of the release to 
the market. Therefore after 2008, the underwriting agreements often includes a clause for 
significant shift in the overall market conditions. 
The decision to issue a bond instead of borrowing the money from a financial institution is 
based on the assessment of the cost and benefits of the alternatives. And even when the 
company would favor to lend from an institution there can be restrictions in this post-crisis-
era that the business operates, which deny the corporate from lending. For example, after 
the financial crisis, many banks were forced to create larger capital buffers against defaults 
which caused the banks to decrease their lending. This resulted in a so called “credit 
crunch” which forced the companies to issue bonds in order to fulfil their need of debt 
financing (Brunnermeier, 2008). Issuing company may also wish to exploit a low interest 
environment that is not reflected in the price of a simple bank loan. Additionally, there is a 
variety of other incentives for the issue e.g. publicity, credit limits or special appetite for 
corporate debt in the market. These motivations are discussed in the following chapters 
presenting the theories of debt capital structure. 
2.3 Corporate debt capital structure 
After familiarizing with the principles of corporate bonds and the general issuance process, 
it is necessary to analyze the previous theories on why the quantitative easing could have an 
impact on the issuance of corporate bonds. Since the QE in its current form and scale has 
not been evidenced in the financial market before, theories of the asset purchase programs 
effect on the financial market have not yet been included in the prolific studies on debt 
choice. In order to provide a theoretical background on why the APP could have an impact 
on the corporate bond issuance, we should focus on the effect on the corporate bonds as a 
part of capital structure and this way the theory part should appear a bit more coherent. 
Impact of APP into the corporate decision making process can be explained with existing 
theories discussing the choice of corporate debt capital structure which can be divided into 
two classes: (1) trade-off and (2) pecking order theories. 
In principal, when a corporation is about to invest into a physical asset or finance a venture, 
it should decide whether or not to invest based on the rates of return of the investment and 
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the required interest rate of the funds that are required to finance that investment. 
According to Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) “capital structure irrelevance” if there would 
be no risk of bankruptcy and no taxation, there would be no optimal capital structure for the 
investment. But the interest payments on debt offer a tax shield and equity investors often 
require a higher return which is why a company wishes to optimize the capital structure to 
achieve a lower average cost of capital. Indeed this explains why the company should 
maintain a certain share of equity in its balance sheet but does not provide an explanation 
for switching between the two, i.e. why there is a time-variation in the portion of debt 
versus equity.  
2.3.1 Trade-off theory 
Again, referring to Modigliani’s study where it is stated that in the efficient markets capital 
structure is irrelevant and there should not exist a financial gain from switching between 
debt and equity. Trade-off theories emerged on the principle that companies evaluate costs 
and benefits of different leverage plans to achieve the optimal capital structure. Trade-off 
theories can be divided into static and dynamic theories which are shortly described below. 
Static trade-off theories 
Static trade-off theory emerged after the Modigliani and Miller’s study included the tax 
shield effect of interest payments. If there would be no cost for increasing the share of debt 
in the company’s balance sheet, the optimal capital structure would be 100 percent debt. By 
introducing the bankruptcy cost into the equation, Myers (1984) stated that a company 
should set a target debt-to-equity ratio and gradually move toward that target by balancing 
the interest tax shield against the cost of bankruptcy. 
Dynamic trade-off theories 
The dynamic trade-off theories emerged from the fact that static theory could not explain 
the time-varying movements in the companies leverage structure. According to the dynamic 
theories the financial markets are to some extent inefficient and segmented and the 
company executives try to time the market for issuing debt or equity, carrying out the so 
called “market timing theory”. Baker & Wurgler (2002) claim that the corporations tend to 
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issue equity during times of high market value i.e. high share price and consequently use 
debt to repurchase shares when the equity market value is low. This implies that the equity 
issues would be more frequent during bull markets and thus the issuance of corporate bonds 
would increase to fund the repurchases of shares during bear markets. They also state that 
the corporate capital structure is a result of historical attempts to time the equity market. 
But later studies (e.g. Leary & Roberts 2005) criticised that the effects of market timing is 
only temporary and the adjustment/administrative costs relating to issuing new debt or 
equity restrict the companies from aggressive issuance. 
2.3.2 Pecking order theories 
In addition of the static trade-off theory Myers (1984) introduced the pecking order theory 
where he states that the companies prefer internal financing i.e. using retained earnings for 
investments and if external funds are raised the company considers first debt and then 
equity issuance. In this framework there is no preferred debt-to-equity ratio but the order of 
usage is determined by the cost of capital from which the above mentioned pecking order 
emerges. The key motivation is adverse selection which gives the executive a superior 
knowledge over an investor and thus the manager always has the opportunity to choose the 
cheapest mean of financing. Another motivation for the pecking order is the agency theory, 
claiming that the managers avoid using external financing because it often requires 
providing financial information to the clients. 
The pecking order theory’s relevance to bond issuance is limited compared to for example 
the dynamic trade-off theories. These dynamic theories of financial market’s impact on 
capital structure decisions is a key element when considering the effects of QE to the 
corporate debt issuance. As the reader now understands the corporate capital structure 
approach, the following two chapters discusses the theories related to corporate bond 
issuance in the dynamic trade-off theory’s framework. These chapters are meant to clarify 
the theories discussing the relationship between the investors, corporates and the 
quantitative easing. 
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2.3.3 Gap-filling theory 
Gap filling theory is important concept for this thesis because it provides us evidence from 
the previous literature on how the companies adjust the maturity structure of their debt 
according to the existing market conditions. As the central banks have launched asset 
purchase programs of government bonds, the demand and supply equilibriums of these 
government securities changed accordingly.  Greenwood et al. (2010) claim that as 
government debt is purchased from the market by the central banks, corporate bonds with 
similar maturities provide liquidity to the investors who were bought out from the 
government securities. Corporates are able to provide this liquidity provided that the risk 
characteristics and maturities match the investor appetite. The selection of the maturity of 
the bond issue is widely discussed and previous research focuses on three different methods 
for corporations to choose correct maturity for their debt issuance, descriptions and 
critiques is provided below: 
(1) Match the maturity of assets and liabilities is based on the static trade-off theory by 
Myers (1984) which represents very practical point of view to determining the maturity of 
an issue. But because assets are somewhat constant and do not change in terms of maturity, 
this approach does not explain the large movements in the issuance levels of short vs. long 
term debt that have been witnessed in the market.   
(2) Alter the liability structure according to the market conditions which translates in to 
borrowing short term when the yield curve is steeply upward curving to maintain a 
relatively low interest expense costs (Marsh 1982). Timing the market for low interest rates 
is questionable since the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates states 
that the yield of a longer maturity bond is composed of the yields of shorter maturity bonds. 
Therefore this approach violates the expectations hypothesis as there should be no financial 
gain from optimizing the liability structure to the steepness of the yield curve (Faulkender 
2005). 
(3) Issue debt according to the expected return. Corporations should issue short term when 
the return of the short term debt is below the expected return of the long term debt (Baker, 
Greenwood & Wurgler 2003). Regarding the alternative of executives being able to 
forecast the expected return of the debt: It is tempting to assume that the corporate 
financiers have a unique perspective of the developments of the future interest rates but do 
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the companies have an advantage to detect mispricings over the sophisticated investors (i.e. 
banks, institutional investors etc.) that purchase the debt issued? Greenwood (2010) also 
assumes that there is some predictability in the expected returns (i.e. returns are in some 
sense mean reverting) but that the corporates do not have the ability to predict the future 
returns. Instead they act as a provider of liquidity when there are movements in the 
macroeconomic liquidity factors. They find that as the supply of long-term government 
securities increases, the corporates tend to issue more short term debt to fill around 30 to 
40% of the gap created by a shock to the government debt maturity. 
2.3.4 Portfolio rebalancing theory 
The channels through which the QE affects the financial markets are under rigorous debate. 
This thesis will not focus on the different theories of monetary policy since only a few of 
them focuses on impact of QE to the financial market. Origin of the idea that the monetary 
actions precede movements in the real economy is first observed by Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963) after which the economists have focused on explaining why this might be 
the case and introduced effects to interest rates, bank lending, asset prices and so forth. It is 
to be noted that asset purchase program is applied only if the traditional measures, such as 
lowering the policy rate close to zero, are not effective. Purchase programs transmit to the 
market through five channels, all of which increase the aggregate spending and inflation. 
Firstly, asset purchase programs increase the overall confidence in the market, as the 
central bank actions tend to decrease volatility in the market and signals that CB is to be 
supportive in its policies for an extended period of time which often leads to appreciation in 
the equities market. One could claim that the policy signaling has become increasingly 
important for the market like the renowned speeches by the heads of the central banks have 
evidenced. For example, Mario Draghi’s speech on 26th of July in 2012 in the midst of the 
escalation of the sovereign debt crisis calmed the investors and decreased volatility even 
though no real tools were mentioned. Asset purchase programs also increase the liquidity in 
the market and increase money supply which should increase bank lending as their 
increased balance sheets are forwarded to the private sector. Transmission channels of QE 
are illustrated in Figure 3 below.  
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Portfolio rebalancing channel is important to the bond issuance related literature since it 
focuses on the effect of purchases to the investor portfolios. Fundamental idea is that as the 
central bank purchases government debt from the private sector, the QE increases the 
money held by this sector since reserves are transferred in exchange for bonds. 
Consequently it affects the quantity and mix of securities held by the public as they replace 
these government securities with assets that may be similar or riskier compared to the 
previously held assets (Friedman and Schwartz 1963.). During this rebalancing process, the 
asset prices will rise (i.e. yield decreases) until the market is again saturated. As the 
hypothesis of this study states, the saturation comes in form of increased corporate bond 
issuance. 
  
Central Bank 
Asset Purchases
Confidence
Policy signalling
Market liquidity
Asset prices and 
exchange rate
Spending and 
income
Inflation target %
Portfolio 
rebalancing
Money supply Bank Lending
Figure 3. Transmission channels of central bank monetary actions. Adopted from Mishkin (1996) 
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3. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Previous literature on the implications of QE to the financial market is rather extensive and 
ranges from a more theoretical approach of QE from the general market equilibrium 
perspective and, since 2008, empirical studies examining the implications of QE to the 
financial markets have emerged. The latter group of studies comprises largely of event-
studies relating to the effect of U.S. quantitative easing on asset prices and to the different 
transmission channels of QE. The four main areas of empirical research are (1) 
transmission channels of QE (2) QE impact on domestic asset prices (3) QE impact on 
international financial markets and (4) QE impact on corporate debt issuance levels. Since a 
fair share of the previous research is conducted on the implications of the U.S. Federal 
reserve operations, Table 4 below is provided for the reader to assess the timeline of U.S. 
Federal Reserve’s monetary actions. It is important to understand that even though Fed 
finished the latest QE3 purchases in October 2014, the acquired assets from each program 
will stay in the Fed balance sheet for an extended period of time. 
 
Table 4. Historical events relating to Fed's open market actions after the financial crisis, bolded is the QE 
program in question followed by short description of the  action. (Fed, 2014) 
Year Date Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC) actions 
2008 25th Nov 
QE1: Initial announcement that Fed will purchase up to $100 bn of 
agency and $500 bn of MBS bonds 
2009 18th Mar 
QE1: MBS and agency debt purchases increased to $1.2 trillion and $200 
billion respectively and purchases of Treasuries up to $300 bn announced 
2010 
10th Aug 
QE2: Fed reserves will be kept on current levels by reinvesting principal 
payments from MBS and agency debt into longer term U.S. Treasuries 
3rd Nov 
QE2: In addition to reinvestment policy, further $600 bn of Treasuries will 
be purchased with a pace of $75 bn per month by the end of Q2 2011 
2011 21st Sep 
Operation Twist: $400 bn of 6 to 30 years maturity Treasuries is 
purchased and equal amount of <3 years maturity will be sold by Q2 
2012. Also referred as the Maturity extension program (MEP) 
2012 
13th Sep/ 
12th Dec 
QE3: open-ended commitment to monthly purchases $40 bn of MBS 
agency debt and in December addition $45 bn of Treasuries   
2013 18th Dec 
QE3: FOMC announces tapering (reducing) the monthly purchases by $10 
bn after each meeting 
2014 30th Oct 
QE3: Monthly purchases are ended, ten months after the tapering 
announcement. 
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Previous research on the transmission channels of quantitative easing focus on implications 
of increased government spending to different asset classes. The objective of these studies 
often is to measure how the underlying objective e.g. decreasing the long term interest rates 
was achieved and through which channels this change in the interest rates transmitted. This 
is closely related the previous section where the Figure 3 described different channels for 
QE. 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) were among the first studies to assess the 
channels and the impact of the U.S. QE1 and QE2 to the interest rates. By using an event-
study methodology around the announcement days of the QE programs Krishnamurthy et 
al. distinquish between six different channels of which three were found significant in both 
QE1 and QE2 and three of which were applicable only for QE1. A possible explanation for 
this is that QE1 was directed at MBS, agency and Treasury debt whereas QE2 had a higher 
emphasis on Treasury debt. Firstly, the signaling channel i.e. the financial markets 
expectation of future lower Federal funds rates which lowers yields on all bonds. Secondly, 
long term safety channel where yields on medium and long maturity bonds fell because of 
increased demand for safe assets. Thirdly, inflation swap rates indicated that expected 
inflation increased during QE’s which meant larger reductions in real than nominal interest 
rates. This third channel is named the inflation channel. The latter group of channels which 
were only present during QE1 includes the equilibrium price channel. This equilibrium of 
the mortgage-specific risk in terms of price decreased during QE1 but not during QE2. 
Second is the default risk channel since they find that QE1 lowered the risk premiums of 
corporate bonds and third is the liquidity channel increasing the yields of most liquid 
bonds. Krishnamurthy et al. especially emphasize the importance of signaling channel in 
their results and they convey that CB’s should be extremely careful regarding the perceived 
message of the announcements. The importance of signaling channel also reminds about 
the possibility that the same effect of QE2 could have been achieved by a mere 
announcement from the FED committing to lower future rates and thus exploiting the 
signaling channel. 
Possible critique to the Krishnamurthy et al. results especially relating to the findings on the 
importance of signaling channel is that the event study method cannot properly distinguish 
between expectation channel and effect of the actual intended purchase. If the FOMC 
would only be implying that the purchases will start, it might not have the same effect than 
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FOMC actually starting the purchases. Another issue relating to the comparison between 
the two QE programs is that during QE1 the markets were extremely distressed in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis which might have even enhanced the importance of the 
signaling channel i.e. compared to a situation where there would have been less volatility 
and hence less need for comforting words from the behalf of Fed. One interesting notation 
is that Krishnamurthy et al. regard the portfolio rebalancing channel in their analysis as a 
function of the earlier mentioned safety channel. They state that the safety channel applies 
to assets within a low default risk class and investors substitute purchased assets only 
within the same risk and maturity class. Later studies such as Duca et al. (2016) have 
shown that the investors also substitute government debt and MBS’s with corporate debt, 
supporting the portfolio rebalance theory but not the safety channel theory presented by 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen. 
In a close relationship with the research on the transmission channels of QE is the impact of 
quantitative easing on both the domestic (i.e. U.S.) and international asset prices. Since the 
Large Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) programs in the U.S. were conducted by purchasing 
both U.S. Treasuries and MBS securities, the literature on the impact of QE to these two 
securities is somewhat extensive and a few key studies is presented below with the purpose 
to find the elements that are of relevance for this thesis. 
Gagnon et al. (2011) research on the LSAP1 effect on financial markets is one of the 
benchmark studies in this area of research since it utilizes the event-methodology to study 
the effect of QE to a wide variety of financial assets, including corporate bond yields. 
Before discussing the main results of this study, an interesting observation is that rather 
than just stating the effect on financial markets, the authors also evaluate success of the 
LSAP program execution. Gagnon et al. claim that by announcing the size of the programs 
beforehand (LSAP1 was announced to be up to certain amounts of purchases of MBS and 
Treasuries) the Fed created a self-fulfilling prophecy. By announcing the amounts ex ante, 
there was little room for adjustments to changing financial environment and investors 
expected the programs to be executed to the full extent. They leave it for future research to 
investigate whether the announcement should be closed or open-ended in terms of the size 
of the program. This is interesting because the ECB restricted to merely announcing the 
size of the monthly purchases and stating that the purchases will be continued until deemed 
unnecessary. This is also noted in later studies presented in this section i.e. how the 
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different announcement methods can create problems for the research for example in the 
form of endogeneity in the regression (Duca et al. 2016). But in order to return to the 
conclusions of the research in the Gagnon et al. research: They state that by purchasing 
long term bonds, the LSAP programs lowered especially the 10 year U.S. Treasury term 
premium by approximately 30 to 100 basis points (bps) and thus flattening the yield curve 
from the long-term side. And as the term premium is a component of the expected yield in 
other risky fixed-income securities, LSAP consequently lowered the yields of corporate 
bonds as well, even though these were not the direct subject of the purchases. The 
cumulative effect on corporate bond yield index (issues rated Baa by Moody’s) around the 
FOMC announcement dates of QE1 was around minus 70 bps whereas 10 year U.S. 
Treasury term premium and MBS agency yield decreased 156 and 113 bps respectively. It 
is thus evident that the corporate bond yield index was impacted the least compared to the 
two securities that were a direct target of the program. A (subjective) critique for this article 
is that the effects of the QE announcements are cumulated over a 2 year period during 
which the corporate bond yield index fell almost 500 bps indicating that the investor 
confidence improved significantly during the period. This raises the question of what share 
of the change in the index during the announcement date is due to the improvement of 
general confidence in the market and what is accountable for the announcements. The 
authors address this issue by admitting that the rebound in economic outlook and a sharp 
reversal of flight–to–quality were part of the reason why their results were robust. 
Previously in this thesis we have separated between the effects of QE to stock and flow 
effect. When discussing these two effects in the context of asset prices, the stock effect 
translates into cumulative change in yields during the QE program and the flow effect is the 
change in yields during a specific time-period of purchases. D’Amico and King (2013) 
investigate the flow and stock effects of large-scale treasury purchases to asset prices Since 
this distinction between stock and flow effects is important for the outcomes of this thesis, 
it is worthwhile to explore this research with detail. 
D’Amico and King are among the first researchers to employ data on the level of individual 
issues of Treasury bonds to examine the stock and flow effects to the security directly 
affected by the LSAP1 in the US. Distinctive is the fact that they focus directly to the 
$300bn Treasury purchases in 2009 to estimate the “local supply” effect, defined as the 
decrease in value of a given security in response to purchases of that security and securities 
30 
of similar maturity. Stock effects are estimated by modeling the cumulative change in the 
price of each Treasury issue as a function of the percentage held by the Fed whereas the 
flow effects are estimated as the change in price of each issue during the day of purchase as 
a function of the total amount purchased. Equations 5 and 6 are provided for further 
clarification: 
(5) 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 =
𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
 
(6) 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  =
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
 
The analysis of stock and flow effects is extended with breaking the data into subsamples to 
account for differences between notes and bonds, short and long maturities and older issues 
versus recently issued securities which differ in terms of trading volume and liquidity (off-
the-run vs. on-the-run issues). Results state that collectively the local supply effect 
decreased the Treasury yields by 30 basis points, an average of 1 basis point for each $10 
billion of holdings (stock effect) and an additional 3.5 basis points reduction in yield 
accountable for an individual purchase (flow effect). As the authors suggest, if this 
reduction was transmitted to private credit sector it would have significantly decreased the 
lending costs of companies and individuals. The research does not explicitly suggest that 
this would be the case but as the credit spreads declined across the board during the 
LSAP1, it is probable that also the lending costs declined to some extent. This can be 
interpreted as supporting evidence for this thesis since the decrease in lending costs can be 
viewed as an incentive for the companies to increase the issuance of debt. 
The studies presented so far have focused on the implications of U.S. quantitative easing to 
domestic (U.S.) asset prices and yields which provides a good foundation for further 
analysis but for the purpose of this thesis regarding the European market, it is also 
necessary to analyze the  international implications of U.S. quantitative easing. It is safe to 
assume that since the U.S. economy can be perceived as an important driver for the world 
economy and the size of the U.S. QE program was significantly larger in absolute amounts 
than the ECB’s QE, preliminary assessment is that the U.S. QE had a spillover effect on the 
European credit market as well. The magnitude of this effect is left for the empirical part of 
this study. 
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International transmission channels and effects of the U.S. QE programs are discussed in 
the paper published by Fratzscher et al. (2013) where they examine the international 
spillovers of the Fed QE distinguishing between emerging and advanced economies, a total 
of 65 foreign countries are included in the study. Authors focus on investigating capital 
injections into foreign equity and bond funds during QE1 and QE2 which enables them to 
observe portfolio flows between U.S. and the foreign countries. A distinctive characteristic 
of this study is that it does not only focus on the event-window around the announcement 
of the QE but also to the actual roll-out of the program. By focusing on the operations of 
Fed rather than the announcements, they gain more insight to the decisions relating to 
portfolios and re-pricing of credit risk in the global perspective. 
Fratzscher et al. detect that the two QE programs differed significantly in terms of the 
ultimate effect on the market. They argue that the first LSAP increased the prices of bonds 
and equities in the U.S. which consequently raise the price of the U.S. dollar. Conversely, 
the second LSAP increased the prices of global equities after which the U.S. dollar 
depreciated. Authors claim that this is due to different market conditions during the QE 
programs and also the different products purchased in the two programs (i.e. MBS & 
Treasury). This is consistent with the underlying goal that the Fed had for the two 
programs. The first QE was to reduce the cost of borrowing and increase the availability of 
debt to the private sector whereas the second program was intended to decrease the long 
term interest rates to support economic activity, boosting asset prices and demand. Another 
explanation for significant appreciation of U.S. dollar is that once the QE1 started, the 
investors in emerging economies and to some extent the advanced economies shifted their 
portfolios towards U.S. equities and bonds because U.S. assets are generally perceived safer 
than the European counterparts. But during the second program, once the Fed purchased 
Treasuries from the investors, they were crowded out from these investments and forced to 
rebalance portfolios towards riskier assets. Once again, this gives an indication of the 
existence of portfolio rebalancing during asset purchase programs. 
Another interesting result from Fratzscher et al. (2013) is that the Fed policies seem to have 
both pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical effects in emerging and developed economies. It 
would appear that Fed policies explain around 4.4% of the equity inflows and 6.0% of bond 
outflows in emerging markets between 2007 and 2011. These figures should be assessed 
with caution as the employed controlling variables might not be able to fully capture the 
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convenient timing for in the economic cycle for drawing these conclusions and the authors 
admit that the endogenous problems are difficult to fully control. Perhaps the significant 
conclusion is that even in the presence of endogeneity, the sudden changes in capital 
inflows and outflows are further enhanced by the QE program in the emerging economies 
as the investors herd in and out of their investments. For the corporate bond issuance topic 
the research by Fratzscher et al. provides further evidence of the portfolio rebalancing but 
also regarding the expected result: It seems that the Fed actions have been a major driving 
force of the global capital movements, which would indicate that the actions by ECB might 
not prove significant. 
When shifting the focus into the studies researching the impact of quantitative easing on 
corporate bond issuance, at the time of writing this thesis, the literature is still relatively 
scarce and empirical studies discussing the effects on bond issuance are concentrated on the 
effects of Fed QE to both U.S. and global market. McCauley et al. (2015) study the effect 
of quantitative easing to bond issuance denominated in US dollar and analyses the 
relationship between monetary policy, leverage and the investor risk appetite. They argue 
that since financial crisis the amount of outstanding debt in USD has increased by 50% 
from $6 trillion to $9 trillion which indicates that the QE has changed the global liquidity 
characteristics and especially increased the international holdings of U.S. dollar 
denominated debt.  
Although the focus of the research is slightly tipped towards analyzing the overall credit 
growth after the financial crisis, the methodology is in itself interesting. How they control 
for the growth in the credit is one of the key takeaways for the purposes of this thesis and is 
shortly described below. McCauley et al. distinguish 5 different factors as the determinants 
of credit growth including short-term rates (borrowing costs), long-term rates (yield on 
investment), equity market volatility, bond market volatility and global controls. These 
methods are similar to what is presented by Duca et al. (2016) and are reasoning for the 
inclusion of these factors also in the regression analysis of this thesis. One interesting fact 
is that McCauley et al. allow different transmission channels of QE to bond markets 
whereas Duca et al. assumes more straightforward transmission of QE. 
Significant findings emerge from McCauley’s research as they state that the non-financial 
sector has provided a large share of dollar credit to the non-US residents through corporate 
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bond markets and the surge in dollar borrowing appears to be associated with decreasing 
term premium following the Fed actions. This straightforwardly implies that the changing 
market conditions i.e. decreasing term premium incentivize the corporations to borrow 
higher amounts of money especially through the bond market. This also implies that 
McCauley et al. do not consider the portfolio rebalancing or gap-filling theory to explain 
the movements in the issuance levels. This is at odds with the evidence presented 
previously in this literature review and also with the next research presented which assumes 
that the abovementioned theories are the key drivers in pushing corporate issuance on 
higher levels after the QE. 
Duca et al. (2016) analyze the impact of U.S. quantitative easing to global corporate bond 
issuance including 18 emerging markets (EME) and 20 advanced economies (AE). This 
research is highly influential to the methods and reasoning applied in this thesis for it 
investigates specifically the QE impact to bond issuance and combines several theories 
presented in the Chapter 2 of this thesis with evidence for both gap-filling theory and the 
portfolio rebalancing channel. In the dependent variable, a distinction is made between 
stock (level of holdings) and flow (additional purchase) effects similar to D’Amico & King 
(2013) and explanatory variables include quantitative easing policies and controlling 
variables relating to global and domestic factors. Explanatory variables are measured in 
percentage of the respective country’s GDP in order to control for the improvements or 
downturns in the general economic environment. The domestic and global factors are 
especially designed to capture firm’s investment opportunities and credit supply. 
For the advanced economies, Duca et al. find that the flow effects are present in both 
Treasury and MBS purchases. In the case of emerging markets, the QE had a significant 
impact on the corporate bond issuance levels through the stock channel as they claim that 
the issuance would have been approximately half of the volume witnessed without the QE. 
In summary this would mean that stock and flow effects are present in both groups of 
countries but the flow effect is more important for AE and stock effect in EME. 
Especially the first program which included the purchases of MBS products activated the 
portfolio rebalancing channel. This is not as robust in the case of the Treasury purchases, 
indicating that the risk characteristics of corporate bonds are too far apart from the 
Treasuries for investors to switch between them. These results are robust to wide variety of 
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additional factors which include different measures for risks and more interestingly the test 
for actions by other central banks. Duca et al. state that the foreign central bank’s actions 
did not have a significant effect on the bond issuance, although the results are only tentative 
according to the authors. Significant contribution of this paper is that the corporate bond 
issuance is not only affected by the decreasing yields or cheaper debt, but also by the fact 
that as investors are forced from the market they replace the government bonds with assets 
of the same characteristics, in this case the corporate bonds which in turns incentivize 
corporations to issue more debt. The benchmark model predicts that a purchase of 
Treasuries equal to 1% of the total debt increases global corporate bond issuance by 0.1%, 
as for the MBS purchases the respective increase is 0.12%. 
After familiarizing with the Duca et al. research the reader might ask why this thesis is 
focusing on the ECB as it already included in the Duca et al. study. The reason for this is 
twofold: Firstly, the data utilized by Duca et al. does not include the latest ECB QE 
program from March 2015, which is significantly larger than the previous programs and is 
thus expected to provide significant results for the corporate bond issuance in Europe. 
Secondly, the country specification for advanced economies in Duca et al. included 
Australia, US and UK which expectedly are not affected by ECB actions as much as their 
own central banks, which motivates the study of purely European data.  
Summary of the previous researches is provided in Table 5. Following chapter focuses on 
the descriptive information of the data and methodology that are employed in this study. 
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Table 5. Summary of previous literature 
Author Title Contribution / Main results 
Krishnamurthy 
and Vissing-
Jorgensen 
(2011)  
The effects of quantitative easing 
on interest rates: channels and 
implications for policy 
Distinguishing between 5 different 
transmission channels. Highlighting the 
importance of signaling channel 
Gagnon et al. 
(2011) 
The financial market effects of the 
Federal Reserve's large-scale asset 
purchases 
10-year Treasury lowered by 30-100 bps. 
Criticize the execution of LSAP program 
as a self-fulfilling prophecy 
D'Amico & 
King (2013) 
Flow and stock effects of large-
scale treasury purchases: Evidence 
on the importance of local supply 
Examines the purchase and balance sheet 
channel of QE. LSAP decreased 10y yield 
by 30 bps, average of -1 bps for every $10 
bn purchased 
Fratzscher et 
al. (2013)  
On the international spillovers of 
US quantitative easing 
Time-series analysis of 65 countries 
during QE1 and QE2. QE1 boosted US 
asset prices and USD appreciated & QE2 
boosted international asset prices and 
USD depreciated. Furthermore, QE had a 
pro-cyclical effect on EMEs 
McCauley et 
al. (2015)  
Global dollar credit: links to US 
monetary policy and leverage 
QE1 decreased the Treasury term 
premium and consequently lowered corp. 
bond yields. Non-financial sector 
provided a significant portion of the 
dollar credit to foreign countries 
Duca et al. 
(2016) 
Global Corporate Bond Issuance: 
What role for US quantitative 
Easing? 
QE increased the global corporate bond 
issuance especially in EMEs. MBS 
purchases forced the investors to 
corporate bonds due to similar risk 
characteristics. 1% increase in Treasury 
purchases increased corporate bond 
issuance by 0.1% 
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4.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the ECB APP effect on the corporate bond 
issuance and contribute to the existing literature on QE effects to financial markets. In order 
to achieve this goal, a wide range of different data resources is utilized. Description of the 
data and the methodology is provided in the following subchapters.  
4.1 Data 
The data employed in this study consists of corporate bonds issued by European companies 
in the Eurozone countries (EU19) with adding Czech Republic and removing Cyprus from 
the EU19 description. Reason for this is that the data availability for the variables chosen 
was extremely low and Czech Republic provides better data availability while being 
centrally located in Europe. These countries are then divided into developed and frontier 
markets in order to differentiate between different response to the asset purchase programs 
due to differences in the level of financial market integration and also to control for the 
gaps in issuance data in the frontier markets. Grouped countries in Table 6 below. 
Table 6. Research countries grouped to developed and frontier markets 
Developed markets   Frontier markets   
Germany DE Czech Republic CZ 
France FR Slovakia SK 
Italy IT Slovenia SL 
Spain ES Malta MT 
Netherlands NL Estonia EE 
Belgium BE Latvia LV 
Luxembourg LU Lithuania LT 
Finland FI 
  
Austria AT 
  
Portugal PT 
  
Ireland IE 
  
Greece GR     
 
The bond data consists of 15 499 bonds issued from January 1st 2000 to 31st December 
2015. Bond data is downloaded from Bloomberg and includes all issues (matured and 
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active) from non-financial corporations. Issues are aggregated to quarterly issuance 
amounts in EUR and allocated to respective ultimate parent country of risk. This means that 
for example issues by Deutsche Telekom AG’s subsidiary “Deutsche Telekom Finance 
BV” listed in the Netherlands, is accounted as a bond issue in Germany. This method is 
recommended by e.g. Duca et al. (2016) and Shin (2014). Descriptive statistics of the 
corporate issuance data is provided in Table 7 below: 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable: quarterly European corporate bond issuance data. 
Sample period ranges from Q1 2000 to Q4 2015 with a total of 1216 observation points 
Description Market Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Non-financial corporate bond 
issuance in bn. euros 
Developed 4,84 3,04 0,00 54,59 
Frontier 0,15 0,20 0,00 1,94 
Non-financial corporate bond 
issuance as % of GDP 
Developed 0,38 0,33 0,00 7,75 
Frontier 0,07 0,19 0,00 3,24 
Observations (Quarters) 
Developed 768    
Frontier 448    
 
As we can see from the descriptive statistics already, the developed markets differ 
significantly from the frontier markets in terms of activity and size. One could argue that 
countries included in the frontier markets, do not possess the necessary financial 
infrastructure to issue debt to the markets which would partly explain the differences. 
Figure 4 shows how the bond issuance has increased in size after the financial crisis and 
also illustrates the effect of the financial crisis to the corporate bond market as the banks 
decreased their lending, the issuance of corporate bonds  peaked. It would also appear that 
the aggregate corporate bond market is increasing over time with the period after the 
financial crisis averaging well above EUR 600 million in issuance each quarter. Figure 5 
represents the corporate bond issuance in percentage of the respective country’s GDP and 
clearly indicates how issuance in the frontier markets has increased significantly after the 
financial crisis. For the purpose of this thesis the issuance is expressed as percentage of the 
GDP as it captures the possible economic developments in our regression and eases the 
problems with possible econometric biases.  
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Developments evidenced in Figures 4 and 5 of the corporate bond markets are influenced 
by variety of factors that depend on factors like the economic development, interest rates 
and the performance of alternative investments such as stocks. In order to account for these 
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Figure 5. Corporate Bond Issuance in EU19 countries in percentage of GDP between 2000 and 2015. 12 
month moving average. (Bloomberg 2016) 
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Figure 4. Corporate bond issuance in EU19 countries in million euros between 2000 and 2015. 12 month 
moving average. (Bloomberg 2016) 
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developments, a variety of controlling variables is obtained to control for possible 
externalities between the dependent and main explanatory variables. Selection of these 
variables is based on Duca et al. (2016) but altered for the European data set. The 
controlling factors along with descriptive statistics are provided in Table 8.  
Table 8. Descriptive statistics for the main explanatory variables. Sample period from Q1 2000 to Q4 2015 
Variable(1) Description Mean Std Dev Min Max 
ECB holdings of debt 
securities in % of 
total EU debt – 
Stock effect 
Total amount of debt securities held by 
the ECB in % of the total debt. Source: 
ECB and Bloomberg 
4,36 3,64 0,70 15,08 
ECB purchases of 
debt securities in % 
of total EU debt – 
Flow effect 
Change in the amount of securities 
held by the ECB in % of the total EU 
debt. Source: ECB and Bloomberg 
0,27 0,63 -0,36 3,04 
VIX Average difference in daily closing price 
for implied volatility of S&P500 during 
each quarter. Source: Yahoo Finance 
20,67 8,24 11,03 58,60 
ECB key interest rate 
(real) 
ECB interest rate for deposit facility 
minus the expected one year ahead 
inflation expectation. Source: ECB 
-0,43 1,05 -1,90 2,05 
10 year Benchmark 
yield 
Euro area 10-year Government bond 
benchmark yield. Source: ECB 
3,81 1,07 0,96 5,49 
Return of local 
equities 
Local equity market index return in %(2) 
Source: Bloomberg 
1,06 11,98 -44,12 72,12 
Realized volatility of 
equities 
Quarterly volatility of the country's 
equity index. Source: Bloomberg 
19,38 9,81 0,00 75,58 
Domestic claims Nominal growth rate of the country's 
bank debt to the private sector. Source: 
IFS 
-0,06 0,73 -4,82 0,91 
International bank 
debt 
Nominal growth rate of the 
international bank debt. Source: IFS 
0,79 2,97 -5,42 7,55 
(1)Table 10 for correlation analysis of the main explanatory variables 
(2) Appendix 1 for the list of country indices and equity market performance 
Following sequence is to provide explanations for the explanatory variables and to provide 
extra insight on how these variables are to effect the corporate bond issuance. Main 
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explanatory variables relating to the research topic is the effect of both purchases and the 
holdings of debt securities to the corporate bond issuance. When examining the timeline of 
the ECB purchases, it becomes evident that the holdings of the government debt increased 
significantly after the announcement of the first QE program but especially in 2015 once 
latest purchase program commenced. Table 9 is provided to further clarify the schedule and 
the magnitude of the ECB purchases and indicates also the significant difference in sizes of 
the QE programs. By December 2015, the latest QE program is already larger than the 
previous programs combined and it is expected to continue until economic balance is 
restored in the Eurozone. Figure 6 further explains the unconventionality of the ECB QE 
program. Until 2009 the balance sheet of ECB included little government issued securities 
but has since increase significantly 
Table 9. Timeline of the open market operations by the European Central Bank. ECB (2016) 
Date Program Action Volume in 
Dec 2015 
2.7.2009 CBPP1 
CBPP1: First covered bond purchase program of 
investment grade covered bonds. Terminated in 
30.6.2010 
EUR 60.0 bn 
10.5.2010 SMP 
SMP: Securities Markets Program to ensure liquidity in 
market segments. Program terminated in 6.9.2012 
EUR 210.0 bn 
3.11.2011 CBPP2 
CBPP2: Direct purchases CB's from primary and secondary 
markets. Terminated in October 2012. 
EUR 16.4 bn 
20.10.2014 CBPP3 
CBPP3: Third covered bond purchase program to support 
financing conditions and facilitate credit provision 
EUR 143.0 bn 
21.11.2014 ASBPP 
ABSPP: Purchase of asset-backed securities to diversify 
funding sources and stimulate new issues from banks.  
EUR 15.0 bn  
9.3.2015 PSPP 
PSPP: Purchase of public bonds i.e. government and 
multinational agencies located in the euro area.  
EUR 500.0 bn   
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The main explanatory variable, i.e. the central bank purchases, is separated between the 
total holdings and additional purchases of the debt securities. This is consistent with 
D'Amico and King (2013) and Duca et al. (2016) and enables the discovery of both stock 
and flow effects of the central bank purchases. Furthermore, as the variable is measured in 
percentage of the total debt, it supports the discovery of the portfolio rebalancing channel 
as an increasing share of the total debt is held by the ECB, the investors are crowded out 
from the debt securities. In December 2015, ECB already owned close to 15% of the total 
Eurozone government debt. 
The implied volatility index or VIX measures the average volatility of the S&P500 index in 
during each quarter and is often used as a indicator of global uncertainty (Bekaert & 
Hoerova, 2014). Although it is not entirely straightforward, the bonds function at least 
partially as a safe haven for the equity investors when the uncertainty is high. This does not 
directly lead to increased issuance but exhibits the increased appetite for stable debt 
instruments during times of financial distress and high volatility. 
The ECB key interest rate is set by the ECB governing council for the euro area. ECB can 
control the banks willingness to deposit funds to the central bank by altering the deposit 
facility interest rate which determines the interest on overnight deposits. After turning the 
rate negative in 2014, the ECB has continuedly lowered the rate and as of December 2015 
Figure 6. Outstanding Eurozone government debt (left axis) and total ECB debt holdings of (right axis), QE 
related holdings in black area. Bloomberg (2016) 
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it is set at negative 0.3 per cent. The real key interest rate is calculated by deducting the 
year ahead inflation expectation (ECB 2016.). The key interest rate can be seen as an 
indicator of the bank and lending activity as the negative interest rate encourages banks to 
lend money to the market and private sector. 
The Euro area 10-year government benchmark bond yield is ECB’s indicator of the average 
yield for 10 year government issued debt in the Eurozone. The average yield of 3.81% may 
seem low but one has to account the relatively long stability of the Eurozone before the 
financial crisis and strong stable economies such as Germany and France have supported 
the low yield environment. Previous studies have evidenced the inverse relationship 
between corporate bond issuance and long term yields. This relates to the theory section of 
this thesis where the market timing is discussed. Financial managers pursue to benefit from 
cheaper credit which is why increased levels of corporate bond issuance should be observed 
during low yield environment (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). 
The following two variables are meant to capture the country specific information on the 
equity markets as the VIX can be perceived as a more general and global indicator of risk. 
Firstly, the local equity returns expresses the market performance of the respective country 
during each quarter. The indexes used for this variable and country specific statistics are 
provided in the Appendix 1. Purpose of these variables is to capture the local financing 
conditions which may vary significantly across Europe. It is also shown in previous 
research that companies might engage in stock buy-backs financed by issuing bonds when 
they are expecting positive future returns in the equity market i.e. when the share value is 
low (Baker, Greenwood & Wurgler 2003). Local equity market volatility is included to 
separate between domestic factors that vary between the countries and the more general 
indicator VIX.  By investigating different countries equity markets it is apparent that there 
are significant differences between the countries. For example, in Germany the mean return 
for the DAX index between 2000 and 2015 is 1.36% whereas in Portugal the corresponding 
return is -0.78%. It is thus reasonable to include the country specific factors into the 
regression.  
Factors relating to the credit supply i.e. the domestic claims and the international bank debt 
are discussed in the robustness checks section of this thesis along with additional analysis 
on the QE effect on the individual bond issue characteristics and the effect of other central 
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banks, namely the Federal Reserve of the U.S, Bank of England and Bank of Japan actions 
on the Eurozone corporate bond issuance. 
4.2 Methodology 
Analysis of the variables described in the previous section is conducted with following 
methodology. Variables are formed into a panel data set by country of issuance following 
the setup introduced in Duca et al. (2016). Since the data includes quarters of zero issuance 
especially in the case of frontier markets, the data is treated as unbalanced panel data – the 
implication of this is further discussed later in this chapter. Regression method used is 
ordinary least squares (OLS). Duca et al. also suggests using Tobit equation because of the 
nature of always positive dependent variable (i.e. gross issuance cannot be negative) which 
is why the results of using the Tobit equation is represented in the robustness checks along 
with other alternative econometric techniques. 
The impact of European central bank asset purchase programs to the corporate bond 
issuance is evaluated with the following panel setting: 
(7)  𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡+ 𝛽2𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖,𝑡 
where the dependent variable 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the corporate bond issues in country i in quarter t as a 
percentage of the country i GDP.  
The main explanatory variables are stock effect which is the ECB debt holdings at the end 
of quarter t as a percentage of the total debt and flow effect which is the ECB debt 
purchases during quarter t as a percentage of the total Euro–area debt outstanding. The 
Market variable includes the average VIX return, ECB key interest rate and the benchmark 
yield for 10 year government bonds in the Eurozone in quarter t. These market variables are 
expected to capture the effect of improved/declined financing conditions on the corporate 
bond issuance. The Domestic variable group includes both the return and volatility of the 
equity market in country i in quarter t and are meant to capture the country–specific 
changes that might affect corporate bond issuance in respective countries. Different from 
previous research (e.g. McCauley et al. 2014) no distinction between different debt 
products is made. This is due to couple of reasons: Firstly, the availability of data casts 
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limits on differentiating between different debt products and countries because the ECB 
does not report purchase quotas in categorized manner but merely on aggregate level. 
Secondly, even in the case where categorized data would be available, the decreased 
volume after separating the products to different debt tranches would reduce the 
explanatory power of the variables. In researches based on U.S. data the distinction was 
more obvious as the Fed reported the purchases separately for Treasuries and MBS’s.  
As mentioned earlier, the dataset includes quarters during which there is no issuance data 
available. Especially in the case of frontier markets, the portion of zero values is relatively 
high, 310 out of 448, and the reliability of the regression results must be scrutinized. In the 
case of developed countries the zero values are less prominent (47 out of 768). Following 
the reasoning by Woolridge (2002 p.488) if this lack of data would be a cause of economic 
environment or fiscal imbalances, it would be reflected in the national accounts such as the 
GDP and act as an evidence that some explanatory variable could explain the zero issuance. 
But as this is not the case, assumption is made that the zero values in data are likely to be 
caused by informational reasons (i.e. all issues are not listed in Bloomberg), no further 
actions are needed as the statistical package Eviews controls for the existence of zero 
values. 
Before conducting the regression analysis on the data set, a choice between fixed effects 
estimator and random effects estimator in the regression is necessary. As Woolridge (2002, 
p.481) argues, the random effects estimator should be used if it is expected that the 
unobserved effect of omitted variables is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. In 
practice, this would mean that the explanatory variables are able to almost fully explain the 
variation in the dependent variable i.e. the issuance amounts. There is a number of reasons 
why this might not be the case: Firstly, the dataset does not include explanatory variables 
relating to e.g. corporate developments or more specific variable on the market 
characteristics. This means that the explanatory variables are probably not able to fully 
explain the changes in the dependent variable. As Woolridge (2002) expresses, situations 
where explanatory variables would explain majority of the movements in the dependent 
variable are rather an exception than a rule. Secondly, the previous researches (e.g. Duca et 
al. 2016) where random effects estimators are used, assume that there is no significant 
correlation (i.e. endogeneity) between the explanatory variables. This is not the case in this 
thesis but it is assumed that the ECB actions are linked to the subsequent actions of the 
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market participants. For example, in this thesis the additional liquidity provided by the ECB 
is assumed to have an effect in the benchmark yield as it is previously discussed that the 
yield is linked to the demand of the government securities.  
Assumption that the benchmark yield and the QE are correlated is further evidenced in 
Table 10 which shows a relatively high correlation coefficients between ECB holdings, 10 
year benchmark yield and the policy rate. Also the VIX and local equity return are highly 
correlated which is partly explained by the asset markets co–movement and is addressed by 
testing how the regression results are impacted by excluding variables from the regression.  
 
The results for the Hausman–test (Hausman 1978) which is used to choose between random 
and fixed effect model are presented in Table 11. The test compares the standard error of 
the random effects estimation to the fixed effect estimation by examining the variance in 
the explanatory variables from random and fixed model results. The idea is to use random 
effects model unless the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis. The illustration is 
provided in equation 8 where βFE / βRE is the coefficient outputs of fixed effects and random 
effects estimation while the denominator is the difference in variances of the respective 
coefficients. 
(8) 𝐻𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 =  
(𝛽𝐹𝐸 − 𝛽𝑅𝐸)
2
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛽𝐹𝐸 − 𝛽𝑅𝐸)
⁄   
  
Variable
ECB 
Purchases
ECB 
Holdings VIX
ECB Policy 
Rate
Benchmark 
10y yield
Local 
equity 
return
Local 
equity 
volatility
ECB Purchases 1,000 0,491 0,245 -0,255 -0,360 -0,131 0,219
ECB Holdings 0,491 1,000 -0,166 -0,760 -0,760 0,027 0,052
VIX 0,245 -0,166 1,000 0,255 0,349 -0,402 0,615
ECB Policy Rate -0,255 -0,760 0,255 1,000 0,703 -0,211 0,062
Benchmark 10y yield -0,360 -0,760 0,349 0,703 1,000 -0,139 0,091
Local equity return -0,131 0,027 -0,402 -0,211 -0,139 1,000 -0,340
Local equity volatility 0,219 0,052 0,615 0,062 0,091 -0,340 1,000
Table 10. Correlation statistics of the main explanatory variables 
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Table 11. Hausman–test scores. A higher precision in the coefficients is visible for distinguishing 
the different coefficients 
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
Stock effect 0.0328538 0.0329009 0.0000003 0.928 
Flow effect -0.1033506 -0.1030885 0.0000032 0.884 
ECB policy rate -0.0413820 -0.0413486 0.0000022 0.982 
Benchmark yield 0.0689118 0.0690686 0.0000021 0.914 
Local equity return 0.0036906 0.0036727 0.0000000 0.868 
Local equity volatility -0.0008379 -0.0009114 0.0000000 0.609 
 
If it would be the case that the probabilities would be close to zero or less than 0.05 we 
could accept the null and use the random effects model, but as it is not the case and all p–
values range above 0.6 we can safely assume that the fixed effects estimation methods is 
more efficient for conducting the regressions in this thesis. For the sake of validity, the 
results from the random effects model and the Tobit equation are included in the robustness 
checks section of this thesis. The regression also controls for heteroscedasticity in the error 
terms by using White robust standard errors. 
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5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The results of the empirical research are presented in the following section. Firstly, the 
results of the benchmark model with the main explanatory variables are presented after 
which we continue with further analysis with additional factors and time periods.  
5.1 Benchmark model 
Before introducing additional factors in to the equation, the results for the so–called 
benchmark model are presented in Table 12. The purpose of this is to understand the 
fundamental effects of the QE in the regression model and to provide a comparison of 
results to the model applied by Duca et al (2016).  
Table 12. Benchmark regression model estimating the impact of ECB asset purchases to corporate bond 
issuance. First panel presents the impact on all 19 countries, second to developed markets and the third to 
frontier markets, t–statistics in parenthesis. Statistical significance of the explanatory variable indicated with 
an asterix: * 10%, ** 5% and ***1% level of confidence. Sample data range from Q1 2000 to Q4 2015. 
Dependent variable:  All countries Developed Frontier 
Corporate bond issuance in % of GDP       
Constant 0,000 0,000 0,000 
 
-(0,018) (0,118) -(0,141) 
ECB holdings in % of total debt (Stock) 0,034*** 0,045*** 0,015** 
 
(4,577) (4,072) (2,091) 
ECB purchases in % of total debt (Flow) -0,056** -0,086** 0,001 
 
-(2,024) -(2,103) (0,030) 
ECB Real Policy Rate -0,005 -0,005 -0,002 
 
-(0,204) -(0,149) -(0,075) 
VIX 0,003 0,006 -0,001 
 
(1,053) (1,345) -(0,423) 
10y Benchmark Yield 0,035 0,045 0,013 
 
(1,573) (1,348) (0,611) 
Local Equity Return 0,003** 0,005** 0,000 
 
(2,222) (2,047) -(0,265) 
Local Equity Volatility -0,003* -0,005 -0,001 
 
-(1,823) -(1,554) -(0,593) 
 
   
R squared 0,500 0,505 0,091 
SE of the regression 0,005 0,006 0,003 
Observations 1216 768 448 
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Table 12 indicates a strong positive relationship between ECB debt holdings and the 
corporate bond issuance. According to the regression results, during the sample period in 
all cross-section countries, the increase in debt holdings of the ECB increased bond 
issuance by 0.03 percent of the GDP in each quarter. In cumulative terms this would mean 
an annual increase of 0.12% in issuance due to ECB QE. This provides evidence of the 
stock effect in European debt markets i.e. the increased holdings of ECB force the investors 
to seek alternative investments because of the decreased availability of government debt 
securities. This result holds true across different econometric methods as is shown in the 
robustness analysis. The second explanatory variable, the ECB purchases of corporate debt, 
has a negative impact on the corporate bond issuance according to the regression results. 
This might seem counterintuitive to the findings relating to the stock effect and deserves a 
closer examination of the possible reasons behind this result. 
The flow effects parameter in the regression is generated as the change in the total debt 
holdings of the ECB which does not consist purely of the QE purchases made by ECB but 
also of other debt products held in the balance sheet of ECB. This aggregate amount is 
affected by other factors such as sovereign states repaying their debt or sterilization of debt 
securities purchased previously. If we look at the Figure 6 in the chapter 4 which shows the 
ECB debt holdings we can evidence a significant decline between the years 2012 and 2014 
after which the debt holdings surge in 2015 because of the latest APP. ECB states in its 
press release of 2014 financial statements that the “Total liabilities decreased mainly owing 
to … sterilizing the liquidity injected under the SMP” and “Total assets decreased, mainly 
owing to early repayments by counterparties of … longer–term refinancing operations” 
(ECB a,  2015). This means that during the years of which the corporate bond issuance 
increased significantly (as evidenced by Figure 4 and 5) the ECB holdings of debt actually 
decreased which explains the negative coefficient of the ECB purchases in Table 12. This is 
also consistent with the fact that ECB did not conduct any significant asset purchasing 
programs between 2012 and 2014 as CBPP2 terminated in Oct 2012 and CBPP3 did not 
commence before Q4 2014 as Table 9 in Chapter 4 shows. 
Before suggesting an adjusted version of the Duca et al. (2016) benchmark model, a brief 
overlook on the effect of other explanatory variables. It seems that the local equity return 
has some explanatory power in the case of the developed countries and as the developed 
economies represent a significant share of the observations in the whole dataset, the 
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coefficient is significant on 5% level also in the case of all countries. According to the 
trade–off theory the corporate bond issuance should increase during economic downturns 
as the companies, presumably, issue debt to engage in share–buybacks. The results in the 
benchmark model cannot confirm this theory since the bond issuance and equity returns 
have a positive coefficient, opposite to the theory stated. On the other hand if the equity 
returns and bond issuance are positively related, this would mean that during economic 
upswings the lending activity also increases. This could mean that the companies are for 
example investing more when the confidence in the economy increases along with stock 
returns and therefore need more debt financing. These motives are purely speculative in 
nature and a more qualitative data should be employed to account for further analysis on 
the subject. 
5.2 Adjusted model 
Next the benchmark model is adjusted to account for the discrepancies observed in the first 
regression. Firstly, the negative coefficient of the ECB purchases to corporate bond 
issuance controlled with a dummy variable. The variable excludes the period where the 
debt holdings of the ECB was decreasing in size i.e. taking the value of zero between Q2 
2012 and Q3 2014 and value of one in other periods. This enables us to better assess the 
effect of the actual ECB asset purchase programs and excludes the period where there were 
no active asset purchase programs.  
Furthermore, the high correlation between VIX and local equity market volatility is 
addressed by excluding the VIX from the regression results. This still allows us to control 
for the volatility observed in the market but limits the endogeneity and multicollinearity 
issues arising from the inclusion of two highly correlated variables into one regression 
model. The effect of these changes is represented in Table 13 below. 
In this adjusted model, the main findings of the benchmark model still hold true. The ECB 
stock effect is still highly significant in developed European countries with an increase in 
the holding resulting in approximately 0.034% increase in the debt issuance at 1% 
confidence level. This translates into annual increase in issuance by 0.13% of the GDP 
across the developed countries. For the frontier markets the coefficients remain 
insignificant which is likely a result of smaller number of observations. By excluding the 
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periods from Q2 2012 to Q3 2014, the flow effect turns positive although remains 
insignificant. In addition, the dummy variable is highly significant in the case of all 
countries and frontier markets whereas in developed markets only at 10% confidence level. 
These findings confirm that the increased level of ECB holdings of debt securities increase 
corporate bond issuance as the investors are seeking alternative investments due to 
decreased availability of government debt securities. 
Table 13. Adjusted model for estimating ECB QE effect on corporate bond issuance. First panel presents the 
impact on all 19 countries, second to developed markets and the third to frontier markets, t–statistics in 
parenthesis. Statistical significance of the explanatory variable indicated with an asterix: * 10%, ** 5% and 
***1% level of confidence. Sample data range from Q1 2000 to Q4 2015. 
Dependent variable:  All countries Developed Frontier 
Corporate bond issuance in % of GDP       
Constant 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(1.021) (0.845) (0.941) 
ECB holdings in % of total debt (Stock) 0.025*** 0.034*** 0.007 
 
(2.919) (2.834) (0.919) 
ECB purchases in % of total debt (Flow) 0.000 -0.021 0.043 
 
(0.007) -(0.445) (1.439) 
ECB Real Policy Rate -0.002 -0.004 0.003 
 
-(0.069) -(0.135) (0.151) 
10y Benchmark Yield 0.046** 0.063** 0.015 
 
(2.087) (2.032) (0.760) 
Local Equity Return 0.003** 0.005** 0.000 
 
(2.230) (2.119) (0.270) 
Local Equity Volatility -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
-(0.961) -(0.559) -(0.764) 
Dummy excl. Q2 2012 - Q3 2014 -0.001*** -0.001* -0.001*** 
 
-(2.362) -(1.715) -(2.644) 
 
   
R squared 0.502 0.506 0.104 
SE of the regression 0.005 0.006 0.003 
Observations 1216 768 448 
Countries 19 12 7 
*Appendix 2 shows different adjustments of benchmark model, results confirm that although removing VIX 
has a small positive impact on flow effect (-0,056/-0,047), the dummy variable outperforms (-0,056/-0,008).  
Two findings emerge from examining other explanatory variables in the adjusted model. 
Firstly, the benchmark yield for government debt securities in positively correlated with the 
corporate bond issuance at 5% level in the developed countries and all countries cross–
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section. This implies that the decrease in price of the government securities (i.e. the 
increase in yield) causes the bond issuance to increase. This should not be the case as we 
have seen in the theory section of this thesis that the increased yield makes the bonds more 
expensive to the companies to issue (Fabozzi, 2012). It would appear that by removing the 
period where the balance sheet of ECB decreased, we also lose the effect of significant 
decrease in the benchmark yield as it dropped from 4% in Q1 2012 to 1.8% in Q3 in 2014. 
During the same period the issues increased significantly which is could explain the 
observed coefficients. Also the exclusion of VIX which is strongly correlated with the 
benchmark yield might have had similar impact on the benchmark yield and issuance 
movements. Secondly, the positive return on the equity market remains still positively 
correlated with the corporate bond issuance although only at 5% level. Possible explanation 
for this might be the strong positive performance after the financial crisis and overall 
economic upswing which benefited both corporate bond issuance and equity returns as 
explained in the benchmark regression results. 
For the hypotheses presented in Chapter 1, the following conclusions can be made from the 
results: The null hypothesis of no QE effect on the corporate bond issuance is rejected. The 
second hypothesis (H2) of stock effect in the European corporate bond market is accepted 
with statistical significance at 1% confidence level in the case of developed countries and 
all countries included in the cross section. Third hypothesis (H3) is rejected since we find 
no evidence of flow effect in the European corporate bond markets.   
Comparing the results of the adjusted model to the previous results conducted in the U.S. 
market, it is apparent that the results are only partly in line with each other. D’Amico and 
King (2013) found that both the stock effect and flow effect contribute to the decrease of 
the yield curve which would indicate that both of these variables should be significant in 
our results. Additionally, Duca et al. (2016) only find evidence on the existence of the flow 
effect in the corporate bond issuance and that these flow effects are more robust in the case 
of advanced economies. In our model, the flow effect remains insignificant while the stock 
effect is robust especially in the case of developed European countries. There are several 
possible explanations for these discrepancies. Both studies used the Fed QE as a dependent 
variable which alone is enough to explain the differences in the results since the size and 
timing of these QE programs was different from the ECB APPs. Secondly, the cross-
section data in Duca et al. (2016) includes different set of countries, slightly different 
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methodology and different data source from the one employed in this thesis. All the above 
factors should limit the doubts in terms of the results of the adjusted model and in order to 
further examine the validity of the results, we continue to robustness analysis. Also the 
effect of foreign central banks is examined further in the robustness analysis. 
5.3 Robustness tests 
5.3.1 Different econometric techniques 
In the robustness analysis we first examine whether the use of different econometric 
methods in the benchmark and adjusted model affect the results. As both models are 
conducted with fixed effect estimation method, the results are compared to the results of 
random effects estimation and Tobit model which is employed in previous research 
conducted by Duca et al. (2016). The special feature of this Tobit model is that it excludes 
the periods where the dependent variable is zero. Table 14 shows the results for different 
econometric techniques.  
It is apparent from the results of the Table 14 that no significant difference is evidenced 
between the choice of fixed effects or random effects model. Coefficients and their 
magnitude are close to same across all explanatory variables. A notion that might catch the 
eye of the reader is the difference in R–squared between the two models as fixed effects 
model seems to better explain the variation in the dependent variable with the explanatory 
variables. Woolridge (2012 p. 493) explains that the fixed effects estimation method favors 
robustness over efficiency and by reducing the error term, the fixed effects model often 
produces better R–squared than random effects model. Comparing the results of the Tobit 
model to the fixed effects model, we can see that the main finding of the stock effect still 
holds on 5% confidence level while other explanatory variables remain insignificant. 
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Table 14. Results of the adjusted model in all countries using different econometric technique. First panel 
fixed effects model, second is the random effects and the third is the Tobit model. t–statistics in parenthesis. 
Statistical significance of the explanatory variable indicated with an asterix: * 10%, ** 5% and ***1% level 
of confidence. Sample data range from Q1 2000 to Q4 2015. 
Dependent variable:  
Fixed  
Effects 
Random  
Effects 
Censored 
model (Tobit) 
Corporate bond issuance in % of GDP       
Constant 0.001 0.001 -0.002 
 
(1.109) (0.785) -(0.740) 
ECB holdings in % of total debt (Stock) 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.034** 
 
(3.164) (3.185) (2.141) 
ECB purchases in % of total debt (Flow) 0.000 0.000 -0.073 
 
(0.007) (0.004) -(1.139) 
ECB Real Policy Rate -0.002 -0.002 -0.008 
 
-(0.074) -(0.078) -(0.183) 
10y Benchmark Yield 0.046** 0.046** 0.031 
 
(2.260) (2.274) (0.765) 
Local Equity Return 0.003** 0.003** 0.001 
 
(2.393) (2.392) (0.357) 
Local Equity Volatility -0.001 -0.001 0.004 
 
-(1.011) -(1.006) (1.350) 
Dummy excl. Q2 2012 - Q3 2014 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001 
 
-(2.562) -(2.580) -(1.162) 
 
   
R squared 0.502 0.040 
 SE of the regression 0.005 0.005 0.060 
Observations 1216 1216 859 
Countries 19 19 19 
5.3.2 Effect of credit supply 
The fact that the European debt markets are still dominated by lending from the financial 
intermediaries might have an effect on the results of the adjusted model. The external effect 
of the credit supply is addressed by taking into account the changes in (1) domestic claims 
which is the growth rate of country’s bank debt to the private sectors and (2) the growth 
rate of international bank debt. Inclusion of these variables enables us to observe whether 
corporations substitute between corporate bonds and bank lending. For further research on 
the subject, see for example De Fiore and Uhlig (2015) for evidence of the relationship 
between bank lending and corporate bond issuance after the financial crisis. Result of 
including the credit supply characteristics into the adjusted model is presented in Table 15.  
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Results indicate that the inclusion of these two variables does not have a significant impact 
on the other variables except for small changes in the coefficients and the domestic claims 
effect on bond issuance remains insignificant. Interestingly, the international claims show 
strong negative relationship with the corporate bond issuance in cross sections including the 
developed countries. This indicates that the corporations have indeed substituted between 
the two options and the decrease in international bank debt leads to increase in corporate 
bond issuance. It is noteworthy to appoint that even including these variables relating to the 
credit supply, the impact of the ECB APPs remains strong in the developed countries. 
Table 15. Adjusted benchmark model with credit supply effects. First panel presents the impact on all 19 
countries, second to developed markets and the third to frontier markets, t–statistics in parenthesis. Statistical 
significance of the explanatory variable indicated with an asterix: * 10%, ** 5% and ***1% level of 
confidence. Sample data range from Q1 2000 to Q4 2015. 
Dependent variable:  All Developed Frontier 
Corporate bond issuance in % of GDP       
Constant 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 
(1.253) (1.131) (1.035) 
ECB holdings in % of total debt (Stock) 0.024*** 0.031** 0.007 
 
(3.013) (2.447) (0.939) 
ECB purchases in % of total debt (Flow) 0.000 -0.018 0.042 
 
(0.005) -(0.376) (1.414) 
ECB Real Policy Rate 0.000 -0.004 0.007 
 
(0.008) -(0.121) (0.323) 
10y Benchmark Yield 0.043** 0.057* 0.011 
 
(2.035) (1.813) (0.555) 
Local Equity Return 0.003** 0.005** 0.000 
 
(2.339) (2.004) (0.258) 
Local Equity Volatility -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 
-(1.132) -(0.871) -(0.817) 
Domestic claims 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 
(0.398) (0.206) (1.181) 
International claims -0.002** -0.006** -0.001 
 
-(2.338) -(2.124) -(1.107) 
Dummy excl. Q2 2012 - Q3 2014 -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001** 
 
-(2.397) -(1.574) -(2.538) 
 
   
R squared 0.503 0.507 0.107 
SE of the regression 0.005 0.006 0.003 
Observations 1216 768 448 
Countries 19 12 7 
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5.3.3 QE programs by other central banks 
Figure 7 shows how the holdings of the major central banks internationally have increased 
due to quantitative easing programs employed across the economies. It is expected that 
these monetary policies undertaken in foreign economies have had some spillover effects to 
the European corporate bond market as we have read before from Fratzscher et al. (2013) 
and Duca et al. (2016). In order to examine these effects, an explanatory variable is added 
to capture the effects of QE programs by other major central banks including the Bank of 
England (BoE), Bank of Japan (BoJ) and the Federal Reserve of the United States.  
 
Because all QE programs commenced around the same time after the financial crisis, it is 
not reasonable to include them separately to the regression because of high collinearity 
between stock/flow effects across the central banks. In Table 16 the main explanatory 
variables of stock and flow effects are constructed by taking the average holdings of debt 
products by the central banks as a % of the debt outstanding in the respective area. The 
controlling variables for economic activity remain the same as in the adjusted model.  
We see that the stock effect remains significant although decreases slightly comparing to 
the original results. Notably, the effect becomes significant also in the case of frontier 
markets of Europe. This indicates the possibility that the frontier markets did not respond 
that well to European asset purchase programs but for example the Fed QE programs had a 
stimulating impact on the frontier market bond issuance. This could be a result of the 
Figure 7. Holdings of debt securities in % of outstanding government debt after the financial crisis. 
Bloomberg (2016) 
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frontier markets responding better to differences in timing and magnitude of the CB’s 
purchase programs. Continuing with the example of the Fed QE program – it was 
announced during the most severe time of uncertainty after the financial crisis and most 
likely had a significant impact on restoring confidence in all economies, also the frontier 
markets. As a reminder, these results should be taken with precaution since the data on 
frontier markets is not as complete as it would be in ideal conditions. 
Table 16. Foreign central banks effect on corporate bond issuance. Stock and flow effects of Bank of 
England, Bank of Japan, Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank are averaged as the percentage of 
the respective country total debt. First panel presents the impact on all 19 countries, second to developed 
markets and the third to frontier markets, t–statistics in parenthesis. Statistical significance of the explanatory 
variable indicated with an asterix: * 10%, ** 5% and ***1% level of confidence. Sample data range from Q1 
2000 to Q4 2015 
Dependent variable:  All countries Developed Frontier 
Corporate bond issuance in % of GDP       
Constant 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.095) (0.299) -(0.702) 
Major CBs - Stock effect 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.012** 
 
(3.349) (2.574) (2.520) 
Major CBs - Flow effect 0.002 0.004 -0.001 
 
(1.264) (1.344) -(0.286) 
ECB Real Policy Rate -0.021 -0.026 -0.009 
 
-(1.026) -(0.848) -(0.468) 
10y Benchmark Yield 0.060** 0.077** 0.033 
 
(2.461) (2.047) (1.395) 
Local Equity Return 0.003** 0.005** 0.000 
 
(2.256) (2.093) -(0.002) 
Local Equity Volatility -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 
-(0.910) -(0.621) -(0.131) 
Dummy excl. Q2 2012 - Q3 2014 -0.001** -0.001* -0.001*** 
 
-(2.380) -(1.891) -(1.430) 
 
   
R squared 0.502 0.506 0.105 
SE of the regression 0.005 0.006 0.003 
Observations 1216 768 448 
 
To further investigate the impact of foreign central banks, separate regressions on the QE 
programs of the central banks are provided in Appendix 3. Panel A controls for Fed actions, 
Panel B for Bank of England and Panel C for Bank of Japan with the adjusted model. 
Results for the Fed program in Panel A confirm the findings by Duca et al. (2016) that the 
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flow effects of U.S. QE purchases are positive and highly significant in the case of 
developed European markets. It is also important to note that as we include the Fed QE into 
the regression, the coefficients for ECB asset purchase programs become insignificant. This 
would indicate that the U.S. QE was more important in determining the developments in 
the European corporate bond issuance. This is in line with the findings from previous 
research but it is also worth noting that the Fed program commenced several years before 
the ECB APP and with larger quantities, giving it more time to affect the corporate bond 
issuance. In Panel B, the purchase programs by the Bank of England do not seem to have a 
significant impact on the European markets although a more specific research would be 
necessary to draw further conclusions on the matter as the coefficients for the ECB program 
become insignificant. Actions by the Bank of Japan in Panel C indicate that the Japanese 
purchases are not related to the developments in Europe as the coefficients for ECB stock 
effect remain significant. This implies that the ECB QE programs impacted the European 
markets more than its Japanese counterparts.  
5.3.4 The effect on average credit rating, maturity and yield 
This last robustness check focuses on analyzing the characteristics of the debt issues that 
were observed during the sample period. For these tests we replace the dependent variable 
with individual regressions for average credit rating, average time to maturity and average 
coupon. The average coupon is chosen instead of yield since the credit rating and yield 
would measure the same characteristic i.e. the overall riskiness of the issue. One can argue 
that the coupon is an indicator of the yield which is noted but it might still provide more 
insight on the issue characteristics than merely investigating the yield would. These tests 
are to investigate how quantitative easing has impacted companies with differences in 
credit quality. Characteristics of these variables are illustrated in Figure 8. Results of the 
regressions are presented in Table 17. 
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Table 17. QE effects on corporate bond issue characteristics. Coupon, credit rating and average maturity 
employed as a dependent variable with APP and Market factors as explanatory variables.  
Dependent variable:  Coupon Credit Rating Maturity 
 
      
Constant 0,018*** 0,516*** 0,756*** 
 
(3,157) (11,793) (8,172) 
ECB holdings in % of total debt (Stock) 0,095** -0,786** 0,649 
 
(2,256) -(2,465) (0,962) 
ECB purchases in % of total debt (Flow) -0,234 2,289* -0,507 
 
-(1,331) (1,717) -(0,180) 
VIX 0,019** 0,322 -0,210 
 
(1,879) (4,133) -(1,274) 
ECB Real Policy Rate -0,242*** 2,811*** -2,276 
 
-(2,144) (3,291) -(1,260) 
10y Benchmark Yield 0,406*** -0,107*** -2,984 
 
(3,504) -(0,122) -(1,606) 
    R squared 0,329 0,707 0,452 
SE of the regression 0,006 0,043 0,091 
Observations 15499 15499 15499 
Apparent from the panels yield and credit rating is that the ECB QE has both increased the 
amount of high coupon bonds and at the same time encouraged companies with lower 
credit rating to issue more debt. No significant effect is observed from QE on the average 
maturity although Figure 8 would suggest that the average maturity has increased after the 
financial crisis.  
Figure 8. Historical development of average coupon, credit rating and maturity. Coupon is measured as the 
average coupon of the issue and expected yield to maturity at issue, credit rating is the average rating as a 
percentage of the highest (AAA) rating and maturity is the years from issue to final repayment. 
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The finding that average coupon has increased and at the same time the average credit 
rating has decreased supports the theory that QE encourages distressed companies to issue 
more debt. In general one can say that the investors expect higher yield or coupon from 
companies that have lower credit ratings. We can thus confirm hypothesis four (H4) stating 
that the ECB QE has encouraged companies with lower credit ratings to issue more debt in 
the capital markets. This is partly consistent with the findings of Duca et al. (2016) where 
they find that Fed QE was associated with lower credit rating and shorter average maturity. 
These tests on ratings, yield and maturity should be re–examined after the ECB QE has 
reached its maturity since at the time of writing this thesis it might still be too early to draw 
any further conclusions.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis investigates the effect of ECB quantitative easing to corporate bond issuance by 
examining 19 European countries from 2000 to 2015. The study is conducted by examining 
quarterly issuance amounts in each country with a panel of controlling variables in fixed 
effect estimation setting. The main results of this thesis are then reviewed in a series of 
robustness checks with changing econometric techniques and alternative variables.  
Previous researches have indicated that the quantitative easing should have two main 
transmission channels to corporate bond issuance: the impact of ECB holdings of total debt, 
called the stock effect and the impact of additional purchases, called the flow effect. This 
thesis finds evidence of the stock effect in the European corporate bond market especially 
in the developed markets. During the lifespan of the ECB quantitative easing, the stock 
effect has contributed an annual increase of 0.13% to the European corporate bond issuance 
measured in % of GDP. Study finds no evidence of the flow effect between the ECB 
purchases and corporate bond issuance in the European market. 
Based on the results and previous literature conducted in the field of monetary policy 
spillovers, it can be concluded that the ECB QE has affected the financial conditions in the 
European corporate market. By increasing their holdings in the debt securities, the ECB has 
crowded out investors from government securities and forced them to replace these assets 
with corporate debt securities. This in turn has incentivized corporations to issue more debt 
to the market. This supports the “gap–filling” theory presented by Greenwood et al. (2010) 
that the corporate debt functions as a replacement for government securities purchased by 
the central banks. Intervention by the ECB especially in the latest APP commenced in 
March 2015 has accelerated investor portfolio rebalancing and leads to increased corporate 
bond issuance across Europe. 
Additional findings in the robustness analysis suggest that as the European corporate debt 
market is still highly bank oriented and that the decrease in the supply of bank debt 
increases corporate debt issuance. This is consistent with the previous findings from the 
financial crisis when banks significantly decreased their lending, the corporations 
responded by entering the debt capital markets with increasing issuance. Although the 
importance of bond financing in European companies has become more important, the bank 
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debt still dominates which might also impact the results of this thesis as the responses to 
QE are not as apparent as they are in the more liquid U.S. market. Additional tests for the 
impact of foreign central banks QE programs to the European market confirms the previous 
researches results of strong influence of the Fed QE programs after the financial crisis. 
Interesting results emerge when examining the characteristics of the bonds issued during 
the sample period. From 2000 until 2015 the average maturity has increased although not 
directly related to the QE as we find no direct relationship between them. But when the 
average yield and credit ratings of the issues is regressed with the QE variables we find that 
the asset purchases have both decreased the average credit rating and increased the average 
yield required. This indicates that the quantitative easing has encouraged companies with 
higher leverage to issue more debt to the capital markets as the demand for these securities 
has increased through the stock effects of QE. The rise in high-yield debt should concern 
also the central bankers responsible for the policies as the increased leverage might prove 
problematic in case issuing companies experience financial difficulties. 
Results of this study also suggest that the latest ECB asset purchase program that 
commenced in March 2015 will likely have a larger impact on the corporate bond market. 
One drawback of this study was that the latest program by ECB was not mature enough to 
determine its full impact on the corporate bond issuance. In future research this analysis 
should be repeated since now it was possible to capture only the very early impact of this 
historically large APP by the European Central Bank. One explanation for the insignificant 
flow effect could be that the previous programs by the ECB have been much smaller and by 
repeating the study in later time might produce in different conclusions for the stock and 
flow effect. Second suggestion for future research is to focus with greater detail on sector 
specific increases in issuance. It would be valuable information to distinguish sectors that 
are more responsive to accommodative monetary policies. Thirdly, at the time of writing 
this thesis it is still unclear whether the ECB succeeds in its goal to create price stability 
and thus a comprehensive evaluation of the performance of the APP should be conducted 
once the program reaches its maturity.   
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Country Index Coefficient Mean Std Dev Min Max
Return % 1,36 12,54 -36,82 32,87
90 day Volatility 22,80 10,21 10,06 55,79
Return % 0,07 10,17 -28,75 20,86
90 day Volatility 22,20 9,62 9,66 60,07
Return % -0,57 10,81 -26,51 23,13
90 day Volatility 22,78 10,01 7,74 57,14
Return % 0,19 10,47 -21,43 25,24
90 day Volatility 22,42 9,05 9,37 56,66
Return % -0,01 10,79 -32,59 22,24
90 day Volatility 21,16 11,15 8,82 63,45
Return % 1,92 9,18 -24,12 21,45
90 day Volatility 17,31 8,09 7,25 52,15
Return % 0,51 12,66 -32,80 26,60
90 day Volatility 19,31 8,33 9,83 57,31
Return % -0,21 11,87 -30,44 20,76
90 day Volatility 21,80 9,54 11,69 52,05
Return % 1,97 12,19 -36,74 25,67
90 day Volatility 20,65 10,63 9,47 72,33
Return % -0,78 11,17 -25,01 24,37
90 day Volatility 17,79 7,18 5,85 46,62
Return % 1,03 11,88 -34,00 23,70
90 day Volatility 20,29 9,91 8,38 63,91
Return % -1,92 15,17 -37,58 31,21
90 day Volatility 28,62 11,84 11,17 59,55
Return % 1,25 11,18 -28,76 28,82
90 day Volatility 20,72 9,40 10,86 75,17
Return % 2,64 11,08 -20,77 39,88
90 day Volatility 19,07 6,29 7,96 34,61
Return % 1,06 11,23 -37,73 33,89
90 day Volatility 13,90 6,74 6,65 46,72
Return % 0,69 9,75 -16,60 30,68
90 day Volatility 10,88 4,35 5,39 30,82
Return % 3,71 15,10 -41,70 48,84
90 day Volatility 16,53 7,18 6,49 39,99
Return % 3,21 12,85 -29,88 35,16
90 day Volatility 20,29 12,06 8,92 75,58
Return % 3,70 16,40 -44,12 72,12
90 day Volatility 14,89 7,53 5,89 48,33
Lithuania
PX Index
SKSM Index
SBITOP Index
MALTEX Index
TALSE Index
RIGSE Index
VILSE Index
Czech Republic
Slovakia
Slovenia
Malta
Estonia
Latvia
LUXXX Index
OMXHP Index
ATX Index
PSI20 Index
ISEQ Index
ASE Index
DAX Index
CAC Index
FTSEMIB Index
IBEX Index
AEX Index
BELSTK Index
Luxembourg
Finland
Austria
Portugal
Ireland
Greece
Germany
France
Italy
Spain
Netherlands
Belgium
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Appendix 2. Table of different alterations of the benchmark model. Panel A provides the results, should the adjusted model have only removed VIX. 
Panel B for results of adjusted model with the year dummy and VIX.  
Dependent variable: Panel A: VIX removed Panel B: Dummy & VIX included 
Corporate bond issuance in % of 
GDP All Developed Frontier All Developed Frontier 
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.037) (0.136) -(0.192) (1.048) (0.815) (0.999) 
ECB holdings in % of total debt 0.033*** 0.043*** 0.015** 0.026*** 0.037*** 0.007 
 
(4.457) (3.851) (2.122) (3.271) (3.042) (0.877) 
ECB purchases in % of total debt -0.048* -0.071* -0.004 -0.008 -0.038 0.049 
 
-(1.821) -(1.801) -(0.147) -(0.249) -(0.760) (1.563) 
ECB Real Policy Rate -0.006 -0.009 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.003 
 
-(0.265) -(0.268) -(0.058) -(0.018) -(0.023) (0.133) 
10y Benchmark Yield 0.041* 0.058* 0.010 0.041* 0.051 0.018 
 
(1.922) (1.826) (0.500) (1.908) (1.551) (0.897) 
Local Equity Return 0.003** 0.004* 0.000 0.003** 0.005* 0.000 
 
(2.050) (1.899) -(0.097) (2.537) (2.255) (0.052) 
Local Equity Volatility -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.000 
 
-(1.164) -(0.651) -(1.069) -(1.603) -(1.428) -(0.312) 
VIX 
   
0.002 0.005 -0.001 
    
(0.993) (1.288) -(0.527) 
Dummy excl. Q2 2012 - Q3 2014 
   
-0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** 
    
-(2.536) -(1.682) -(2.671) 
 
   
   R squared 0.500 0.504 0.091 0.502 0.507 0.105 
SE of the regression 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.003 
Observations 1216 768 448 1216 768 448 
Countries 19 12 7 19 12 7 
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Panel A: ECB & Fed Panel B: ECB & BoE Panel C: ECB & BoJ
Dependent variable: All Developed Frontier All Developed Frontier All Developed Frontier
Issuance in % of GDP
Constant 0,003*** 0,004*** 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,001
(2,783) (2,735) (0,511) -(0,153) -(0,118) -(0,205) -(0,090) (0,011) -(0,498)
ECB holdings in % of total debt - Stock 0,015 0,025 -0,003 0,006 0,012 -0,009 0,025*** 0,034*** 0,007
(1,243) (1,356) -(0,222) (0,437) (0,577) -(0,697) (3,189) (2,835) (0,880)
ECB purchases in % of total debt - Flow 0,025 0,011 0,051 0,031 0,017 0,070** -0,008 -0,030 0,032
(0,852) (0,245) (1,599) (0,928) (0,317) (2,172) -(0,251) -(0,607) (1,058)
ECB Real Policy Rate 0,011 0,017 -0,002 -0,019 -0,025 -0,013 -0,013 -0,016 -0,011
(0,567) (0,590) -(0,108) -(0,868) -(0,725) -(0,603) -(0,579) -(0,462) -(0,512)
10y Benchmark Yield 0,022 0,020 0,023 0,075*** 0,097** 0,040 0,063** 0,080** 0,035
(1,125) (0,657) (1,061) (3,049) (2,539) (1,685) (2,561) (2,126) (1,492)
Local Equity Return 0,002 0,002 0,000 0,003*** 0,006** 0,000 0,003** 0,005** 0,000**
(1,450) (0,824) (0,398) (2,759) (2,430) (0,464) (2,315) (2,122) -(0,051)
Local Equity Volatility -0,003** -0,004* -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 0,000 -0,001 -0,001 0,000
-(1,976) -(1,726) -(0,549) -(0,689) -(0,287) -(0,273) -(0,747) -(0,373) -(0,316)
Dummy excl. Q2 2012 - Q3 2014 -0,002*** -0,002*** -0,001** -0,001** -0,001 -0,001* -0,001** -0,001 -0,001
-(3,548) -(2,773) -(2,207) -(1,759) -(1,147) -(1,863) -(2,330) -(1,563) -(2,239)
Federal Reserve - Stock 0,001 -0,002 0,007
(0,198) -(0,201) (0,992)
Federal Reserve - Flow 0,002*** 0,003*** 0,000
(4,490) (4,671) -(0,230)
Bank of England - Stock 0,010 0,012 0,009
(1,555) (1,142) (1,397)
Bank of England - Flow -0,002 -0,002 -0,001
-(1,632) -(1,301) -(1,480)
Bank of Japan - Stock 0,004 0,004 0,005
(1,201) (0,799) (1,526)
Bank of Japan - Flow -0,001 -0,001 0,000
-(0,237) -(0,174) (0,128)
R squared 0,507 0,516 0,107 0,504 0,507 0,112 0,503 0,506 0,110
SE of the regression 0,005 0,006 0,003 0,005 0,006 0,003 0,005 0,006 0,003
Observations 1216 768 448 1216 768 448 1216 768 448
Countries 19 12 7 19 12 7 19 12 7
Appendix 3. Actions of foreign central banks in separate regressions. . Statistical significance of the explanatory variable indicated with an asterix: * 10%, 
** 5% and ***1% level of confidence 
